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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 20, 1979, Paul C. Hoffpauir died intestate, leaving behind
a widow, Rosemary Wright; two legitimate children, his daughter Rose-
mary Hoffpauir Schuh and his adopted son Paul C. Hoffpauir, Jr.; an
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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estate valued at two million dollars; and Alana Sudwisher, who claimed
to be his illegitimate child., Shortly after Hoffpauir's death, Alana
Sudwisher filed suit against the Succession of Paul C. Hoffpauir seeking
to be recognized as Hoffpauir's biological daughter and rightful heir. 2
To assist her in this filiation action, Sudwisher sought to compel the
legitimate daughter, Rosemary Hoffpauir Schuh, to undergo a DNA
blood test for the purpose of revealing any relationship between the
two alleged half-sisters. Sudwisher's simple motion to compel blood tests
from the legitimate child, as part of discovery, is the focal point of
both the judgment and this note.
The district court denied Sudwisher's motion, finding that Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396(A), the statute pertaining to who may be ordered
to submit to blood tests in paternity cases, controlled and did not
authorize the testing of anyone other than the mother, child, and alleged
father.3 In a per curiam decision, the supreme court reversed the district
court, holding that "[wihen the blood test statute [Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:396(A)] and the discovery article [Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1422] are considered together, they constitute authority
for granting Sudwisher's motion. ' 4 Rehearing was granted to reconsider
this ruling.' In Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir,6 the majority of the
Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior decision sustaining Sud-
wisher's motion to compel the DNA testing of Schuh's blood, holding
that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1422 allowed the court
to compel the legitimate child to disclose this "relevant evidence." '7
Ironically, the legitimate child was forced "to pay" for the sins of her
father.8
1. Brief for Respondent at 3, Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474
(La. 1991) (No. 91-CC-0515). In all briefs submitted to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
and as reported by the district court, the plaintiff's last name is spelled Sudwisher (no
"c"). However, the Louisiana Supreme Court spelled her name Sudwischer, and that
spelling is used throughout the remainder of this note whenever reference is made to an
opinion of that court. All other references will be made to Sudwisher.
2. Brief for Respondent at 3, Sudwischer, (No. 91-CC-0515).
3. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 474 (La. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992).
4. Sudwisher v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 577 So. 2d 1, 1 (La. 1991) (per curiam).
5. Sudwisher v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 580 So. 2d 366 (La. 1991). This casenote is
primarily concerned with the opinions expressed by the court upon rehearing.
6. 589 So. 2d 474.
7. Id. at 475. Although the court also held that the illegitimate child's "constitutional
right to prove filiation to a deceased father" outweighed the legitimate child's "expectation
of privacy," a comprehensive constitutional analysis of the court's holding is beyond the
scope of this article. Although certain fundamental principles will be discussed where
necessary, a thorough analysis of the many constitutional issues raised by this holding is
the subject of a future article.
8. Ironic because traditionally illegitimate children have been discriminated against
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Sudwischer is a classic case of content over form. The majority, in
its zest to protect the interests of the illegitimate child, improperly
interpreted Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1422. The Louis-
iana Supreme Court in Sudwischer balances the constitutional rights9 of
the two alleged siblings to justify an opinion that is clearly at odds
with the rules of civil procedure. This note, like the case it analyzes,
is not about constitutional rights, but is about statutory interpretation.
The purpose of this casenote is threefold: (1) to discuss how the court
in Sudwischer supports its interpretation of the pertinent statutes; (2)
to analyze thoroughly Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396(A) and Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 1464 in order to arrive at the possible
ways these statutes may be interpreted to resolve the issue of who may
be compelled to submit to a blood test in filiation actions; and (3) to
discuss the various legal implications involved in the use of DNA typing
to prove paternity by testing relatives of an absent parent.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Does Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 Control?
1. The Interrelationship of Civil Code Article 209 and Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396-398
In Sudwischer, the plaintiff sued to establish filiation to her alleged
father pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 209(B). 10 Although Sud-
because of their status-from biblical times: "A bastard shall not enter into the congre-
gation of the Lord; even to his tenth generation shall he not enter into the congregation
of the Lord." Deuteronomy 23:2; to the twentieth century:
The bastard, like the prostitute, thief, and beggar, belongs to that motley crowd
of disreputable social types which society has generally resented, always endured.
He is a living symbol of social irregularity, and undeniable evidence of con-
tramoral forces; in short, a problem-a problem as old and unsolved as human
existence itself.
Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Am. J. Sociology 215, 215 (1939).
For an informative and rather literary discussion of the historical treatment of illegitimates,
see Christopher L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, Part II, Chapter 1 (forthcoming
1993).
9. The dissenting opinion of Justice Dennis follows the lead of the majority by
finding that "this case involves constitutional balancing, but does not focus on the
constitutional rights genuinely at issue." Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 477 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
10. La. Civ. Code art. 209(B) provides:
A child not entitled to legitimate filiation nor filiated by the initiative of the
parent by legitimation or by acknowledgment under Article 203 must prove
filiation as to an alleged deceased parent by clear and convincing evidence in
a civil proceeding instituted by the child or on his behalf within the time limit
provided in this article.
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wisher was a legitimate child," in recognizing the concept of dual pa-
ternity,12 the Louisiana jurisprudence has interpreted Article 209 to permit
a child to establish filiation to a man other than the mother's husband. 3
According to Article 209(C), the illegitimate child must bring a
filiation action either before her nineteenth birthday or within one year
of the death of her alleged parent.' 4 Because Alana Sudwisher was over
30 years old when the action was brought, 5 normally she would have
been barred from filing suit. However, because of a grace period in
the 1980 Act that amended and reenacted Articles 208 and 209,16 Sud-
11. Alana was born in 1951 while her mother was married to Davis Benoit, thus
making her a legitimate child. La. Civ. Code art. 179. Benoit was in prison during 1950-
51. Even if he could have at one time disavowed his paternity (La.. Civ. Code art. 187),
he lost this right to disavow 180 days after having reason to know of Alana's existence.
La. Civ. Code art. 189. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 475.
12. The concept of "dual paternity," which allows a child to have more than one
legally recognized father, was first recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Warren
v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974), and has been often reaffirmed, see, e.g., Smith
v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989); Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 479 So. 2d 324
(La. 1985); Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1982); Succession of Mitchell,
323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975).
13. "[Clhildren who fall into one of the enumerated classes contained in Article 209
are not precluded from instituting a filiation action under that article, they are merely
relieved of the obligation to do so by operation of law." Griffin, 479 So. 2d at 327
(emphasis omitted); "[Olur interpretation of the language 'a child not entitled to legitimate
filiation,' is that it refers not to all legitimate children, but to the child not entitled to
legitimate filiation to the parent to whom he is attempting to prove filiation." Succession
of Levy, 428 So. 2d 904, 913 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983). For an argument in support of
reading the language of Article 209(B) as precluding children who enjoy legitimate status
from bringing a filiation action, see Katherine S. Spaht, Persons, Developments in the
Law, 1980-1981, 42 La. L. Rev. 403 (1982), and Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 480
So. 2d 313, 315-17 (La. 1986) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
14. La. Civ. Code art. 209(C) reads, in pertinent part:
The proceeding required by this article must be brought within one year of the
death of the alleged parent or within nineteen years of the child's birth, whichever
first occurs .... If the proceeding is not timely instituted, the child may not
thereafter establish his filiation, except for the sole purpose of establishing the
right to recover damages under Article 2315.
This 19-or-I year time limitation was upheld on constitutional grounds in Succession of
Grice, 462 So. 2d 131 (La.), appeal dismissed, 473 U.S. 901, 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985).
15. Brief for Respondent at 3, Sudwischer (No. 91-CC-0515) states that plaintiff,
Alana Sudwisher, was nineteen years old in 1969, some eleven years before the present
suit was filed.
16. 1980 La. Acts No. 549, § 4 (amended 1981) provided:
Any illegitimate child nineteen years or older shall have one year from the
effective date of this Act to bring a civil proceeding to establish filiation under
the provisions of this Act and if no such proceeding is instituted within such
time, the claim of such an illegitimate child shall be forever barred.
(This provision was in effect from July 23, 1980 to July 23, 1981, during which time
Sudwisher filed suit.) See Katherine S. Spaht, Persons, Developments in the Law, 1979-
1980, 41 La. L. Rev. 372 (1981).
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wisher's filiation action was timely. Thus, Sudwisher had the right to
bring a filiation action against her alleged deceased father.
Although not expressly mentioned in Article 209, blood tests are an
accepted means of proof commonly used by parties in filiation actions
to determine biological parentage. Not surprisingly, "scientific test re-
sults" are included in the list of types of "proof of filiation" in comment
(b) to Article 209,17 and the evidentiary value of such tests has long
been recognized by American courts.18
In paternity cases involving blood tests, Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396-398 set forth the applicable procedures to be followed.' 9 By adopt-
ing these provisions in 1972, 20 the Louisiana Legislature recognized the
great significance of blood testing in paternity cases. Although in 1972
blood tests were primarily used only to disprove paternity (because the
older tests lacked the ability to link parent to child), today these statutes
facilitate the use of scientific evidence both to support and to refute
paternity claims. 2 Without the use of blood tests, illegitimate children
17. La. Civ. Code art. 209, comment (b) further states: "Contrary evidence would
include but not be limited to the types of proof outlined in the Official Comments to
Civil Code Art. 187." The comment to Article 187 makes explicit reference to "blood
grouping test results or any other reliable scientific test results."
18. See, e.g., Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940). See generally 14 C.J.S.
Children Out-of-Wedlock § 75 (Supp. 1992). The Louisiana Supreme Court recently
commented:
[Tihe modern status [of blood tests] has been described by one commentator
as follows: "As far as accuracy, reliability, dependability-even infallibility-of
the test are concerned, there is no longer any controversy. The result of the
test is universally accepted by distinguished scientific and medical authority ....
[T]here is now ... practically universal and unanimous judicial willingness to
give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test exclusion of
paternity."
In re J.M., 590 So. 2d 565, 567 (La. 1991) (quoting, Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6-
7, 101 S. Ct. 2202, 2206 (1980) (citations omitted)).
19. Found in Code Title VII-"Of Father and Child," Chapter l-"Children," Part
I-A-"Blood Tests For Determination Of Paternity," the particular sections address the
following: § 396-Authority for test; § 397-Selection of expert; § 397.1 -Compensation
of expert witnesses and recovery of testing costs; § 397.2-Chain of custody of blood
samples; § 397.3-Admissibility and effect of test results; § 398-Criminal actions.
20. La. R.S. 9:396 was added by 1972 La. Acts No. 521, and was modeled after
the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, promulgated in 1952, which
was superseded in 1973 by the Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 295 (1992). See infra
note 32 for text.
21. As blood grouping tests have become increasingly sophisticated, the analyst has
become able not only to exclude the possibility of paternity, but also to estimate the
probability of paternity. As testing methods have evolved, so has the judicial interpretation
of these statutes to allow the results to prove as well as disprove paternity.
Through the adoption of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests, the legislature
has demonstrated a willingness to allow scientific data to assist the fact finder
1993] NO TES 1679
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hoping to filiate to a reluctant father would confront the often impossible
task of proving paternity by circumstantial evidence. Conversely, wrongly
accused "fathers" would be denied an invaluable defense.
In a typical paternity case, the blood of the alleged father, mother,
and child is tested to determine the probability that the three are related. 22
The great value of blood testing, when both alleged parents and the
child are tested, resides in its ability to exclude the wrongly suspected
father with certainty.2" Even the most sophisticated blood tests, however,
cannot prove with one hundred percent certainty that the three individuals
are related as child and parents.2 4 For this reason, uncorroborated sci-
entific test results alone cannot prove paternity. 2
Because both of Sudwisher's alleged parents had died before she
filed suit and necrotic tissue of Hoffpauir could not be tested, 26 Sud-
in reaching its determinations. Although scientific testing alone is not sufficient
to prove paternity, it is persuasive and objective testimony that can help establish
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Probabilities by their nature are not
conclusive. They can, however, be used to help prove filiation in a paternity
suit.
LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 497 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (La. 1986). See infra discussion at text
accompanying note 81. See also, Blakesley, supra note 8, at Part II, Ch. 6.
22. Various blood tests, with varying capabilities, exist which can be used for this
purpose. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at Part It, Ch. 6.
23. See, e.g., Odom v. Culverhouse, 505 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
508 So. 2d 824 (La. 1987) (Alleged father seeking custody of child was denied the right
to overcome conclusive blood test results that excluded him as being the father).
24. For a complete discussion of how DNA testing is used to determine paternity,
see discussion infra Section III.
25. See State v. Montgomery 574 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
577 So. 2d 38 (La. 1991) (Mother who presented equivocal evidence failed to establish
the paternity of the defendant, despite test results that indicated "a 99.78% probability
of paternity as compared to an untested, unrelated man of the North American Black
Population."). See also, Minnesota v. Hagen, 382 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(Blood tests indicated a likelihood of paternity of 99.62%. The father admitted to having
sex with the mother, but not during the critical time of conception. Despite the high
degree of probability, the jury found that the man was not the father of the child.). For
other cases and a more thorough discussion of this issue, see generally Blakesley, supra
note 8, at Part It, Ch. 6.
26. "[B]lood testing of necrotic tissue from Hoffpauir is not feasible." Sudwischer
v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 475 (La. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937
(1992). However, some recent decisions demonstrate the feasibility of such testing, not to
mention the rather morbid willingness of some courts to order the exhumation of the
body. See, e.g., Batcheldor v. Boyd, No. 91305C1285, 1992 WL 372539 (N.C. App. Dec.
15, 1992) (The corpse of the intestate alleged father was ordered exhumed, so that DNA
tests could be performed, at the request of the deceased's alleged son.); Alexander v.
Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1311 (Probate Ct. Ohio 1988) ("After taking judicial notice
of the accuracy of the DNA test, the court recognizes that the problems of proof inherent
to an action in which the paternity is alleged should no longer deprive an illegitimate
child of proving paternity;" therefore the body of the. deceased was ordered exhumed
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wisher was unable to compare her blood type to that of her parents. 27
To assist her in attempting to meet the more burdensome "clear and
convincing" standard of proof mandated by Article 209(B), Sudwisher
filed a motion to compel Schuh (Hoffpauir's only legitimate, biological
child) to submit to blood tests for the purpose of DNA testing .2 Her
request was novel because it sought to compel individuals other than
the mother and alleged father to submit to testing. Although the type
of DNA testing requested by Sudwisher would be able to produce relevant
evidence regarding Hoffpauir's paternity, 29 it was neither expressly sanc-
tioned nor prohibited by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396-398.3o
Specifically, 9:396(A) establishes who the court may order to undergo
testing. While Sudwischer was pending, Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396(A) provided:
Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, in
any civil action in which paternity is a relevant fact, or in an
action en desaveu, the court, upon its own initiative or upon
request made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is
involved, may or, upon motion of any party to the action made
at the time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall
and subjected to testing.); In re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (No exhumation was necessary, because blood and tissue samples of the deceased
were in the possession of the coroner.).
27. The primary issue of Sudwischer, as well as the problems associated with the
exhumation of corpses, could be avoided if a DNA print of the individual was available
for analysis. Similar to fingerprinting, but a much more effective means of identification,
an individual's DNA "print" can be made and recorded during an individual's life, or
at death, and saved for future use. "I suggest to individuals ... who have any financial
resources to have a DNA test done and put in their files. It is something to protect your
estate.... We do 'kidcode' at birth. We recommend'having it done at birth . . . a DNA
pattern is good for life." Interview with Dr. Craig Cohen, DNA Expert, in New Orleans,
La. (Dec. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Cohen Interview]. See Estate of Pew, 598 A.2d 65 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 607 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1992) (The medical records of an
alleged deceased father, which indicated the decedent's blood type and effectively estab-
lished non-paternity, were admissible at trial.).
28. Although DNA testing can use human hair, semen, saliva, or scrapings of other
tissue for the purpose of identification, the use of blood, when available, assures optimal
results. This is not to suggest that DNA testing is impossible using hair or other tissue,
but simply that as a practical reality, commercial labs that perform paternity tests primarily
use blood samples. Although semen is sometimes used, given the significant invasion of
privacy occasioned by such a seizure, "blood is the ideal thing." Cohen Interview, supra
note 27. See infra note 192.
29. The type of DNA testing sought in Sudwischer, called DNA fingerprinting, is
capable of determining the possibility that the two alleged siblings shared a common
relative. See infra Section III for discussion of the relevancy of DNA testing under these
circumstances.
30. See infra discussion at text accompanying note 39.
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order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to the
drawing of blood samples .... 1
The narrow issue regarding the interpretation of Louisiana Revised Sta-
tutes 9:396(A) concerns the scope of the statute. That is, does it only
allow the testing of the mother, child and alleged father in every paternity
case, or can the court order others not enumerated in the statute to
submit to testing?
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396(A) is modeled on section one of
the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity.3 2 The primary
purpose of this Uniform Act was to give defendants, usually the alleged
father, the right to demand that the mother and alleged child be tested
in order to prove non-paternity." Indeed, if the properly administered
test did not exclude the defendant from being the father, then the court,
depending upon the likelihood of paternity,3 4 could either admit or
31. La. R.S. 9:396(A) (1990) further provided:
and shall direct that inherent characteristics in the samples, including but not
limited to blood and tissue type, be determined by appropriate testing procedures.
If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question
of paternity against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and
the interests of justice so require.
See infra note 40 for amended provisions to this statute.
32. Section one of this Uniform Act provides:
§ I. Authority For Test.-In a civil action, in which paternity is a relevant
fact, the court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf
of any person whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to
the action made at the time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall
order the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any
parties refuse to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of
paternity against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the
interests of justice so require.
Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (1952) (superseded by the Uniform
Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 295 (1992)).
33. The "Explanatory Statement" to the Uniform Act reads in part:
Scientific analysis of blood samples taken from the mother, the child, and the
alleged father can determine with certainty in a large number of cases that the
person charged with paternity could not be the father. . . . An analysis of blood
samples will establish the fact of non-paternity but will not establish the fact
of paternity.
Id. The redactors of this Act did not envision the revolutionary scientific advances that
were to follow many years later.
34. If the blood tests establish the possibility of paternity, then the rarity of the
alleged father's blood type is directly proportional to the likelihood of his paternity. This
principle, which is based on statistical probabilities, is the same fundamental concept
involved in modern blood grouping, genetic marker, and DNA testing. That is, with older
blood tests, experts could only identify an individual's blood type and compute the
percentage of the general populace who shared that blood type. Since the probability of
paternity is directly proportional to the incidence of the individual's blood type in the
1682 [Vol. 53
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exclude the test results at trial." The original intent of this Uniform
Act was not to force anyone other than the mother, child, and alleged
father to submit to testing, given that in 1952 when the proposal was
adopted the need or relevance of such a request was not within the
purview of the then existing technology.
The following language of both the Uniform Act and Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396(A), however, seems to suggest that it is within
the court's discretion to compel nonparties to submit to testing: "[T]he
court, upon its own initiative or upon request made by or on behalf
of any person whose blood is involved, may or, upon motion of any
party to the action ... shall order .... *"36 If the phrase "any person
whose blood is involved" is read to refer to those other than the mother,
child, and alleged father, then it is arguable that the court possesses
the authority to order almost anyone to submit to testing provided that
her "blood is involved"; however, this language seems to refer only to
who may request a blood test or upon whose behalf such a test may
be ordered-not to who may be forced to undergo testing.
In other words, although this language suggests that the court has
the authority to compel the mother, child, and alleged father to submit
regardless of their party status, it does not necessarily suggest that other
individuals may be forced to undergo testing simply because a request
is made. For instance, in a divorce action where the wife, to prove
adultery, alleges that the husband conceived a child outside of marriage,
the court could apparently order the alleged mother and child, both of
public at large (or within a more specific ethnic group), it follows that if the individual's
unique genetic structure can be identified and then compared to another individual's
genetic structure, then the resultant probability based on a "match" is drastically more
precise than any estimate based on a comparison of the defendant's blood type to the
percentage of individuals in the general public who share that blood type. William C.
Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 Va. L. Rev. 45, 45 (1989).
Stated differently, every person who shared the defendant's blood type was a possible
candidate for paternity. The greater this number, the more likely a coincidence rather
than the defendant accounted for the "positive" test result. If no one else shares the
defendant's genetic structure, then it stands to reason that a match effectively proves
paternity. See infra discussion at text accompanying note 188.
35. The "Explanatory Statement" of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity contends that "Should the results of the test not eliminate the defendant as the
possible father, the trial would proceed as if the test had not been made." Uniform Act
on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (1952), superseded by the Uniform Parentage Act,
9B U.L.A. 295 (1992). In comparison, section 4 of the Uniform Act provides: "If the
experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity,
admission of this evidence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the
infrequency of the blood type." Id. Despite this contradiction, clearly the redactors of
the Uniform Act were skeptical of blood test results which "proved" paternity.
36. Id.; La. R.S. 9:396(A) (1990) (emphasis added).
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whom are nonparties with no direct interest in the divorce proceeding,
to submit to testing "on behalf of" the father "whose blood is in-
volved." '3 7 Similarly, in a divorce proceeding based on the wife's adultery,
or in a disavowal action, this language appears to allow the court to
order the child of the marriage to submit to testing, even if not tech-
nically a party to the action. Additionally, in a filiation action brought
against an alleged parent by the child, if the other parent is not involved
in the litigation, this provision would allow the court to force the
nonparty to submit to testing in order to determine paternity." However,
in any case imagined at the time the Uniform Act was enacted (1953
and 1972), the court is only given the authority to test the three in-
dividuals who are able to provide conclusive proof of non-paternity-
the mother, child, and alleged father. Since proving non-paternity was
the purpose of the Uniform Act, it does not follow that others besides
the parents and child could have been compelled to submit to testing.
Because it appears that the mother, child, and alleged father, even
if nonparties, may be ordered by the court to give a blood sample, it
could be argued that this language expands the scope of those who may
be compelled to submit to testing to include others than those enumerated
in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396(A). Although somewhat suggestive,
this does not mean that the court may order blood tests of a nonparty
who is not an alleged parent or child, but "whose blood is involved."
While the court's discretion as to who may be compelled is arguably
not limited to parties, it is nevertheless limited to the mother, child,
and alleged father. Thus, in Sudwischer, the plaintiff, the alleged child,
could compel both of her alleged parents to submit, regardless of their
party status. In no situation, however, does this language explicitly
authorize the testing of relatives outside of the metaphorical triangle
created by the mother, child, and alleged father.
The issue of who the court may compel to submit to blood testing
is not resolved by either the Uniform Act or Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396. Unless interpreted strictly to preclude the testing of anyone other
than the mother, child or alleged father, under the circumstances present
37. In this case, the court's order would more likely follow a motion by the wife
requesting as much.
38. See infra, Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955), at text
accompanying note 161. In Fong Sik Leung, an Oriental child asserted his American
citizenship by claiming that his father was an American citizen. Although his alleged
father was available for testing, since he was not a party to his son's suit to establish
citizenship, the court refused to order the alleged father to undergo blood tests pursuant
to Federal Rule 35. If, however, a statute similar to the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity could have been invoked, then the alleged father's nonparty status
would not have precluded such a court order, since the child could have been considered
"any person whose blood is involved."
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in Sudwischer, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 does not provide ad-
equate guidance. Because no official statement of policy accompanies
the legislation, any definitive statement of the legislative intent underlying
the statute remains speculative. It is, however, reasonable to assume
that the Louisiana Legislature, when enacting this statute, did not con-
template the factual scenario of Sudwischer.3 9 Although amended after
the Sudwischer case to explicitly allow the compulsion of tissue samples
in addition to blood samples, 40 Revised Statutes 9:396 has not been
modified to authorize the testing of anyone other than the mother, child,
and alleged father'.4  By not making an explicit policy statement con-
cerning the present issue, either before or after Sudwischer, the Louisiana
Legislature has abdicated to the courts the task of determining who
may be compelled to submit to testing.
2. The Louisiana Supreme Court's Opinion
Faced with an ambiguous statute, and no prior Louisiana jurispru-
dence on point, the issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court concerning
the applicability of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 was res nova. The
majority opinion, Justice Lemmon's concurrence, and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Dennis all found that Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396(A) neither statutorily authorized the testing sought by Sudwisher
nor limited the court's discretion in cases where the testing of individuals
other than the mother, child and alleged father is sought. The majority,
after stating that the statute "postulates the existence of an alleged living
father" and, when read in context, is "directed at establishing paternity
for purposes of child support, ' 42 asserts that "[t]here is no indication
39. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at Part II, Ch. I. Moreover, in 1972 the type of
DNA testing sought by Sudwisher did not yet exist. It was not until quite recently, 1984,
that science developed a technique to visually identify DNA for this purpose. See Cassandra
Franklin-Barbajosa, The New Science of Identity, National Geographic, May 1992, at
112.
40. 1992 La. Acts No. 407 amended La. R.S. 9:396(A) (Supp. 1993) to read, in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in any civil action
in which paternity is a relevant fact, . . . the court . . . shall order the mother,
child, and alleged father to submit to the collection of blood or tissue samples,
or both, and shall direct that inherited characteristics in the samples ....
(underlined portion represents modified language).
41. But see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.62 (West 1992), infra note 143.
42. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 474-75 (La. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992). Typically, a paternity action is filed to force a reluctant
parent to meet her financial responsibility of providing child support. Once the child
becomes an adult, this parental duty of support ends. Thus, any filiation action brought
by an adult child will be filed primarily for succession purposes. However, only if the
adult is 18 years old, or like Sudwisher, filed suit within one of the grace periods provided
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that the statutory language expresses a deliberate policy of limitation. ' 43
Although there is equally no indication that public policy favors an
expansive reading of the statute," the majority uses this insight as an
analytical springboard to conclude that the general rules of discovery 45
should be applied to allow testing in cases where a person not enumerated
in the statute is available for testing. 6
The majority's cryptic reading of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396
is better explained by Justice Lemmon in his concurrence. Justice Lem-
mon and the majority read the imperative language of the statute as
limiting the court's discretion only in those situations where the three
parties named therein are available for testing.47 That is, Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396 mandates that the court "shall" order the testing
of the "mother, child, and alleged father" if possible; but if not possible,
then the court, because of the general rules of discovery, may exercise
its broad discretion and order the testing of other persons. Because
Sudwischer cannot possibly test her mother and alleged father, the court
is not bound by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396.
If, however, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 is read strictly, then
the court's discretion is limited in all situations. That is, as discussed
previously,48 given the purpose of the Uniform Act upon which 9:396
is modeled, the court only has the authority to compel the mother,
child, and alleged father to undergo testing. The majority opinion,
however, views the imperative "shall" of the statute as being the only
check on the court's discretion, and so it finds the statute inapplicable
given the facts of Sudwischer.
Although the dissent does not explicitly address the applicability of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396, by primarily attacking the majority's
constitutional balancing, 49 it can be argued that Justice Dennis and Chief
Justice Calogero tacitly agree, given the facts of Sudwischer, that Louis-
for in the amending acts to Article 209, or is bringing a wrongful death action, will a
filiation action brought for succession purposes not be time barred by Article 209(C). See
infra note 71.
43. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 475.
44. "Sudwischer has not offered anything to indicate that the legislature intended
the act to extend to other relatives not enumerated in the act." Id. at 478 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
45. See infra discussion of La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1422 and 1464 at text accompanying
note 94.
46. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 475-76.
47. This statute provides that in certain situations the trial judge "shall order
the mother, child and alleged father to submit to the drawing of blood samples."
The statute does not purport to prohibit the judge's ordering blood tests in
other situations. Therefore, the statute is not controlling in this case, and the
general rules of discovery must be applied.
Id. at 476 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
48. See supra discussion at note 33.
49. Again, the constitutional aspects of Sudwischer are the subject of a future article.
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iana Revised Statutes 9:396(A) does not control. If the dissent had
asserted that the court was bound by the mandates of the statute and
could not order Schuh to submit to testing, then any discussion of the
competing constitutional interests involved would be superfluous. Fur-
thermore, by arguing that. it is inappropriate, because of the intrusive
nature of blood tests, to compel nonparties to submit to testing without
statutory authority, the dissent inadvertently gives credence to the ma-
jority's interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396.50 Significantly,
the dissent does not read the language of the statute as limiting the
court's discretion to include only the mother, child, and alleged father.5 '
By stressing Schuh's nonparty status, the dissent, in effect, says that if
Schuh was a party then maybe she could be compelled to undergo testing
pursuant to the applicable discovery article. According to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396, one's party status is not determinative of the
issue; therefore, to insinuate that an individual's party status is somehow
the operative fact, is to assert that the statute does not apply.52
Focusing narrowly on the issue concerning the scope of the statute,
only Justice Cole, in dissent, argued that "La. R.S. 9:396 is explicit
and controls. . . . It does not authorize the blood testing of an alleged
sibling to prove filiation.'"' Justice Cole assumes the legislature had
good reason not to authorize the testing of any other individuals, and
he reads the statute restrictively. If Justice Cole is correct, then Sud-
wischer becomes a very easy case involving statutory interpretation:
Schuh, since she is not the mother, child or alleged father, cannot be
ordered by the court to submit to blood tests.54
3. Louisiana Appellate Decisions
Despite the potential gap in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396(A)
regarding who may be ordered to submit to blood tests, only two
50. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 478-79 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
51. The dissent also questions whether the majority may use La. R.S. 9:396 "to
support claims of filiation for establishment of rights to a succession." Id. at 478 (Dennis,
J., dissenting). Although this insight has more to do with the dissent's constitutional
analysis, this criticism is unfounded, since the majority does not ultimately use La. R.S.
9:396 to support its order. Perhaps the dissent's inaccurate observation was prompted by
the court's original per curiam decision, in which the majority wrote: "When the blood
test statute and the discovery article are considered together, they constitute authority for
granting Sudwischer's motion." Sudwisher v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 577 So. 2d 1, 1 (La.
1991) (per curiam). On rehearing, the majority retreats from this reasoning and instead
bases its authority to compel blood tests exclusively on La. Code Civ. P. art. 1422.
52. Cf. Voss v. Duerscherl, 384 N.W.2d 499, 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), discussed
infra at note 87.
53. Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at 479 (Cole, J., dissenting).
54. The lower court, the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia, also




Louisiana appellate cases rendered before Sudwischer considered whether
the statute authorized the testing of individuals other than the mother,
child, or alleged father. In Smith v. Jones,5 a first circuit case, an
unmarried man claimed to be the biological father of a married woman's
child. To prove his paternity, the alleged biological father sought to
compel the mother, child, and husband to submit to blood tests pursuant
to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396.56 The court in Smith concluded,
with respect to the application of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 in
an avowal action, that
La. R.S. 9:396 does not provide for the compulsory testing of
anyone other than the mother, the child and the alleged biological
father. Mr. Jones [the legal father] does not fall into any of
the above categories; therefore, the trial court judgment is af-
firmed to the extent that it refused to compel Mr. Jones to
submit to testing under La. R.S. 9:396.17
Interestingly, the court did not characterize the husband of the
mother as an "alleged father." Thus, Mr. Jones did not fall within the
ambit of the statute. The court read the statute as excluding presumptive
fathers from being forced by an outside "father" to undergo a blood
test 8 The court justifies this interpretation by reasoning that Mr. Smith
(plaintiff) had "no right to assert the legitimate father's right of dis-
avowal." 9 Although a blood test that excludes the husband as being
the biological father of the child would have no legal effect on the
55. 566 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
56. The court acknowledged the unwed father's cause of action, reasoning: "[w]here
a biological father has an actual relationship with his child or where he has been prevented
from forming an actual relationship by the mother and he institutes an avowal action
within a reasonable time of the child's birth, he may utilize R.S. 9:396 in an avowal
action." Id. at 414.
57. Id.
58. Other jurisdictions have also considered the status of the husband as a party to
a filiation action. See, e.g., John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 140 (1990) (The court interpreted 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6133 (West Supp. 1992)
(repealed 1990), which mirrors La. R.S. 9:396(A) and is based on the same Uniform Act,
as not affording the putative father the right to compel the '"presumptive' father-husband,"
to submit to testing.); In re Mengel, 429 A.2d 1162, 1168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (Putative
father sought to compel husband to undergo blood tests. Court denied his motion, stating:
"This is an action to determine if appellant [the putative father] is the boy's father; it
is not one to determine who is the father if appellant is not .... The Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity ... provides authority only for tests on appellee [the
mother], the child, and appellant [the putative father], who is the only alleged father in
the present action."). But see Colorado ex rel. M.P.R., 723 P.2d 743 (Colo. Ct. App.
1986) (Specific Colorado statute allows testing of all "possible fathers" in a paternity
action; therefore, a putative father could compel husband to undergo testing.).
59. Smith, 566 So. 2d at 414. See La. Civ. Code arts. 184-190.
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husband's status as father, 60 practically, this determination might cause
the husband to seek a divorce or otherwise act contrary to the best
interests of the child. 6' In a disavowal action, however, the legal father
is considered an "alleged father," and can be compelled by the court
to submit to testing.6 2
In the other lower court case involving this issue, Cormier v. Cor-
mier,63 an adult illegitimate64 child sought to prove biological filiation
to his alleged living father.65 The plaintiff's mother was deceased and
unavailable for blood testing. "[A]t plaintiff's insistence,"" not through
a court order, blood samples were taken from the plaintiff, the alleged
father, and from the plaintiff's maternal aunt. 67 Recognizing that Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 9:396 "makes no provision for such a substitution
for the blood of an unavailable mother,' '68 the third circuit, instead of
either condemning or condoning this "substitution," focused on the
degree of judicial error occasioned by it. Finding that the lower court
committed harmless error in admitting the results of the blood test, the
court dodged the difficult question, saying nothing more than: "The
Uniform Act [on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity] is silent as to
how a party attempting to establish filiation is to proceed where his
mother is, as here, deceased or otherwise unavailable." 69
Smith and Cormier provide little support for either a strict or a
liberal interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396. In Smith,
because the three parties enumerated in the statute were available for
60. If 180 days had expired from the date that the husband knew or should have
known of the child's existence, then the husband lost his right to disavow the child. La.
Civ. Code art. 189.
61. Allowing such an action may have an adverse effect on the family unit. "I am
deeply concerned about the effect that these decisions have on the stability of the established
family unit." Smith, 566 So. 2d at 415 (Carter and Savoie, JJ., concurring). For a
discussion of other practical effects of "dual paternity" on family relationships and
succession law, see Katherine S. Spaht and William Marshall Shaw, Jr., The Strongest
Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell,
37 La. L. Rev. 59 (1976).
62. La. R.S. 9:396(A) applies in "action[s] en desaveu," or disavowal actions brought
pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 187.
63. 479 So. 2d 1069 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
64. Although the plaintiff was a legitimate child, his status did not bar his suit,
because he was "illegitimate" vis-a-vis the alleged father. See discussion supra at note
13.
65. Although not discussed in the opinion, the plaintiff must have filed suit during
one of the applicable grace periods accompanying the amendment of Article 209, since
he was over 60 years old at the time of suit; thus, he would have been barred from
bringing a filiation action under Article 209(C).
66. Cormier, 479 So. 2d at 1071.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1071-72.
69. Id. at 1072.
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testing, the blood type of the husband was rightfully considered irrel-
evant. The plaintiff's objective was to prove his paternity, not to prove
who was the true father of the child. In other words, even if the court
had the discretion to order other individuals to undergo testing, there
was no need to test the husband.
Similarly in Cormier, because the court only addressed the issue of
admissibility, and not whether it could order persons other than those
enumerated in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 to submit to testing,
the opinion is easily distinguished. However, because the court assumed
it was erroneous to admit the test results, as Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396 did not expressly provide for such testing,70 it appears that the
third circuit read the statute strictly. Simply stated, both courts decided
the cases before them without resolving the present issue.
4. Other Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions that have either adopted the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, or have statutes parallel to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396, have addressed this issue. 71 In William M. v.
Superior Court,72 a California appellate court issued a writ of mandate
directing the lower court to vacate its order compelling the parents of
70. "Any conclusion relative to paternity would be highly suspect if based exclusively
on results of a blood test procedure varying substantially from the procedure contemplated
by the Uniform Act." Id. By considering the voluntary "substitution" of the mother's
sister to constitute a "substantial" deviation from the "procedure contemplated" by the
statute, the court implies that only a very restrictive reading of La. R.S. 9:396(A) is
appropriate.
71. Unlike courts in other jurisdictions where specific statutes provide a separate
means of proving paternity, Louisiana courts cannot distinguish between filiation actions
brought for the purpose of inheritance and those brought for child support. "If the
proceeding is not timely instituted, the child may not thereafter establish his filiation ....
La. Civ. Code art. 209(C). Louisiana Civil Code article 209 embraces, at the least, both
actions. With the sole exception of an action brought to recover damages pursuant to
an Article 2315 wrongful death action (see supra note 14 for text of Article 209(C)), a
child seeking to filiate to an alleged father, for whatever purpose, must conform to the
requirements of Article 209. Furthermore, Article 209 allows the adult child who brings
a filiation action for wrongful death purposes to recover tort damages only, not to
participate in the succession of the deceased. The legislature, in implementing Article
209(B) (see supra note 10 for text), which mandates the appropriate level of proof required
to filiate to a deceased parent, presumptively contemplated that actions involving inheritance
matters would be impacted by this statute. And according to Civil Code article 3506(8),
for an illegitimate child to be considered a "child" of her alleged father, she must fulfill
the requirements of Article 209; namely, she must bring a successful filiation action within
the peremptive period of Article 209(C). For cases that do recognize a statutory support/
inheritance distinction, see In re Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (Ct. App. 4th 1992); In
re Estate of Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
72. 275 Cal. Rptr. 103 (Ct. App. 3d 1990).
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a deceased putative father to submit to blood tests. The alleged father,
Michael, died six months after the birth of William M. 73 Three months
after Michael's death, William's mother filed suit against the deceased's
parents in their capacity as personal representatives of Michael's estate.74
The trial court initially sustained the defendant's demurrer upon dis-
covering that no estate existed and that Michael's parents were obviously
not its personal representatives. 7 Amending her complaint, the mother
sued the defendants directly as "Parents of [Michael]." Eventually, after
finding that a prima facie case indicating Michael's paternity had been
presented, the trial court ordered the defendants to submit to blood
tests, citing its "inherent power" as authority.76 The alleged grandparents
appealed.
Interpreting California Evidence Code section 892, 77 which is sub-
stantially the same as Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396, the court stated,
"[G]iven the substantial invasion of privacy occasioned by a compelled
submission to blood tests, we view the specific application of Evidence
Code section 892 only to the mother, child and alleged father as ex-
pressing a deliberate policy of limitation.' '78 The California court refused
73. Id. at 104.
74. Id.
75. Although not expressly stated in the opinion, the majority in Sudwischer distin-
guishes William M. on the basis that Michael died without leaving behind an estate.
Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 475 (La. 1991). The reasoning of
William M., however, does not support this distinction. Even if an estate existed in
William M., thereby making the paternity action one for succession purposes, the blood
group of the grandparent, even if a party, would not be at issue. See discussion infra
at text accompanying note 158. See also In re Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536 (An estate
did exist, but the court still refused to compel the legitimate children of the deceased to
submit to testing.).
Moreover, if indeed the illegitimate child has a "constitutional right to prove fili-
ation," then this distinction would make that right contingent on the existence or non-
existence of an estate, thus reducing her right, which presumably includes strictly personal
and psychological facets, to an economic entitlement. If the existence of an estate is the
determinative factor, then the right to filiate is transformed into the right to inherit.
76. William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The argument that courts possess the "inherent
authority" to compel blood tests does not withstand scrutiny. If a court has the inherent
authority to order blood tests without specific legislation, then the prerequisites of La.
R.S. 9:396(A) and La. Code Civ. P. art. 1464, or any similar statute, are rendered
meaningless.
77. Cal. Evid. Code § 892 (West 1992) (modeled on the Uniform Act on Blood Tests
to Determine Paternity) provides, in pertinent part:
In a civil action in which paternity is a relevant fact, the court may upon its
own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose
blood is involved, and shall upon motion of any party to the action made any
time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, order the mother, child and
alleged father to submit to blood tests ....
78. William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966)).
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to read the statute expansively, finding in it no authority to compel
blood tests of the deceased's relatives. According to the court in William
M., the decision to invade the privacy of someone other than the mother,
child, and alleged father is better left to the legislature. 79 Following the
lead of William M., the court in In re Sanders,s0 a case with facts very
similar to those involved in Sudwischer, refused to apply California
Evidence Code § 892 to support the plaintiff's motion to test the three
legitimate children of the deceased's alleged father and their mothers.
The interpretation of Section 892 in William M. and In re Sanders
supports Justice Cole's strict interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396.81
In a factually similar case in Texas, Manuel v. Spector,2 the alleged
paternal grandmother of a minor child sought a writ of mandamus
directing the lower court to rescind its order compelling her to submit
to a blood test. The alleged father, plaintiff's son, died days after the
birth of his allegedly illegitimate child, J.B.D., and the child's mother
sought to establish paternity, in part, by testing the alleged father's
parents.8 3 Although the court in Manuel allowed the illegitimate child
to filiate after the death of her alleged father, 4 the Texas appellate
court rejected the mother's contention that the lower court had authority
to compel testing through the statute allowing blood tests."5 Unlike the
court in William M., however, the court in Manuel did not read the
79. The court in William M. was impressed by the Minnesota legislature's amendment
to its parallel statute, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.62 (West 1992) (see infra note 143 for the
text of the statute) which expressly provides for the testing of relatives in cases where
the alleged father is deceased. Commenting on this development, the court wrote, "The
amendment of the Minnesota statute to encompass grandparents is consistent with our
view that the issue is one for the legislature to decide." William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at
106 n.5.
80. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (Ct. App. 4th 1992).
81. Unlike Justice Cole in Sudwischer, however, the court in William M. did inquire
into the applicability of the California discovery articles, even after its determination that
the blood test statute reflected a deliberate policy of limitation. See infra discussion at
note 130. This contrast is explained by the differences in the language of the two statutes.
Cal. Evid. Code § 892 (West 1992) does not contain the "[n]otwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary" provision contained in La. R.S. 9:396. See infra discussion
concerning the significance of this language at note 173.
82. 712 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1986).
83. Id. at 221.
84. See Texas Fam. Code § 13.01 (West 1986) (amended 1989), which read in 1986:
"A suit to establish paternity . . . must be brought on or before the second anniversary
of the day the child becomes an adult, or the suit is barred." But see In re George 794
S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1990) (A paternity action cannot be brought after
the death of the putative father.).
85. Although not based on the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity,
Tex. Fain. Code § 13.02(a) (West 1986) (amended 1989), provided, in pertinent part:
"When the respondent appears in a paternity suit, the court shall order the mother,
alleged father, and child to submit to the taking of blood .... "
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blood testing statute as expressing a deliberate policy of limitation;
therefore, like the court in Sudwischer, it examined the pertinent dis-
covery articles in an attempt to find authority to compel the grandparent
to submit to testing. Unlike the court in Sudwischer, however, the court
in Manuel found none. 86
In a Minnesota case, Voss v. Duerscherl,8 7 the trial court 8 initially
ordered the mother, child and alleged father to undergo blood tests to
determine paternity. 9 Before the date of the scheduled test, however,
the alleged father died. The mother then sought to compel the decedent's
father, brother, and sister to undergo appropriate blood testing. In 1982,
a lower court interpreted the then applicable statute9O which was similar
to the present Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396, and denied the motion,
finding that the decedent's relatives were not parties to the action and
therefore could not be ordered to submit to blood tests. 91 Because the
trial court did not deny the plaintiff's motion by strictly construing the
statute, but instead refused to order the testing because of the nonparty
status of the targeted individuals, one can infer that the court found
the statute was not controlling. 92 That is, had the court strictly construed
the statute, any inquiry into the status of the parties would have been
irrelevant. 9 Like the majority, Justice Lemmon's concurrence, and Justice
Dennis' dissent in Sudwischer, this court did not hold that the language
of the blood testing statute was dispositive, but instead looked to other
sources of law to resolve the issue.
B. Is Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1422 Applicable?
1. Article 1422 or Article 1464?
To circumvent the problematic inference drawn from Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 9:396-that only the mother, child and alleged father
86. See discussion infra at note 136.
87. 384 N.W.2d 499 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
88. To avoid unnecessary confusion, reference is being made to a single trial court,
even though the litigation involved in this case included nine different trial courts, three
referees, and two appellate courts.
89. Voss 1, 384 N.W.2d at 500.
90. Prior to the 1983 Revision, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.62 (West 1992) (amended
1983) then provided: "The court may, and upon request of a party shall, require the
child, mother, or alleged father to submit to blood tests or genetic tests, or both. The
tests shall be performed by a qualified expert appointed by the court." This statute is
modeled on § 11 of the Uniform Parentage Act.
91. Voss I, 384 N.W.2d at 500.
92. For a detailed discussion of this case, concerning issues not pertinent to the
present discussion of the blood testing statute, see infra text accompanying note 141.
93. Indeed, although the Minnesota statute does not contain the "on behalf of any
person whose blood is involved" language as found in La. R.S. 9:396 (which arguably
allows the court to compel nonparty parents and children to submit), neither does it
expressly limit the court's authority to only parties to the suit. This "party" prerequisite
does not arise from the statutory language.
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could be compelled to submit to blood testing-the majority and Justice
Lemmon gravitated to the more general evidentiary rule of Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 1422. In moving away from Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396, however, the court overlooked the more appro-
priate, albeit less general, Code of Civil Procedure article 1464.
Chapter 3 of Title III of Book II of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure pertains to the discovery of evidence. The general scope of
discovery is governed by Article 1422 which authorizes the discovery of
any relevant, non-privileged matter. Article 1422 provides, in pertinent
part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not priv-
ileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of
the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tan-
gible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter. 4
The broad scope of this general article is limited by the more specific
articles that follow. 95
Since an individual's blood, the matter sought to be discovered in
Sudwischer, is more related to her "mental or physical condition" than
her "books, documents, or other tangible things,"' ' Article 1464 is more
on point and should have been considered. Entitled "Order for Physical
or Mental Examination of Persons," Article 1464 then read:
When the mental or physical condition of a party, or of a
person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is
in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may
order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination
by a physician or to produce for examination the person in his
custody or legal control, except as provided by law. The order
may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon
notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the
94. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1422 further states: "It is not ground for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
95. See Janine S. Dingleman, Louisiana's Discovery Articles: A Modern Appraisal,
22 Loy. L. Rev. 130, 148-151 (1976).
96. Although the scope of discovery is certainly broader than "books, documents,
or other tangible things," this list does represent the typical material subjected to discovery.
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examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be
made.97
Specifically, Article 1464 provides for the discovery of the "mental or
physical condition of a party" when this condition is "in controversy"
and the mover has made a preliminary showing of "good cause." These
three conditions that attach when a court invades the bodily integrity
of a party are not found in Article 1422, but are included in 1464 to
safeguard the person's fundamental privacy interest in being free of
unwanted governmental intrusions. 9
According to the general rules of statutory construction, the general
article should not supersede the specific article, because such an appli-
97. Article 1464 was amended by 1991 La. Acts No. 324, § 1, to provide: "In
addition, the court may order the party to submit to an examination by a vocational
rehabilitation expert who is not a physician, provided the party has given notice of
intention to use such an expert." The legislature amended Article 1464 to expressly permit
vocational rehabilitation experts to perform examinations. This modification has no bearing
on Sudwischer, however, it demonstrates quite clearly that the legislature is aware of
supreme court decisions and acts accordingly when in disagreement therewith. See infra
discussion at note 99 of Williams v. Smith, 576 So. 2d 448 (La. 1991), the case that
prompted this change.
98. In defining the legitimate heir's right of privacy, the dissent cites numerous
Supreme Court decisions that recognize an individual's "constitutionally protected privacy
and due process rights under both the federal and state constitutions which protect her
from unreasonable invasions or intrusions of her body." Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir,
589 So. 2d 474, 477 (La. 1991) (Dennis, J., dissenting). Justice Dennis cites Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1990) (By
a 5-4 vote, in this case involving a terminally ill patient's "right to die," the Court stated
that "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment."), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S.
Ct. 1678, 1682 (1965) (The contraceptive case that began the modern debate over the
right of privacy by recognizing a "penumbra" of protected freedoms emanating from the
Bill of Rights. In striking down a New York statute banning the use of contraceptives,
the court recognized a "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees."). The other authorities cited by the dissent also recognized this constitutionally
protected right in different contexts. These and other cases affirm the individual's fun-
damental right to be free of unwanted physical invasions.
The only Louisiana Supreme Court case cited by the dissent is Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher, 546 So. 2d 466 (La. 1989), a case involving the right to reject medical
treatment. In Hondroulis, the court interpreted Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 as having been "intended to establish an affirmative right to privacy
impacting non-criminal areas of law and establishing the principles of [those Federal]
Supreme Court decisions in explicit statements instead of depending on analogical devel-
opment." Id. at 473. For a comprehensive discussion of Art. 1, § 5 of the 1974 La.
Const. and Hondroulis, see John Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana
State Constitution: Could Roe v. Wade Be Alive and Well in the Bayou State?, 51 La.
L. Rev. 686 (1991). Furthermore, it is well established that the right of privacy under
the Louisiana Constitution is more encompassing than that same right as protected by
the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982).
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cation renders the more narrow statute meaningless. 99 The specific re-
quirements that "good cause" be shown, that the matter be "in
controversy," and that the person being tested is a party to the suit,
are rendered meaningless if the mere relevancy standard of Article 1422
is applied in place of Article 1464.
Although all discovery articles invade upon the individual's right to
privacy, given the traditional respect afforded the individual's right to
be free of unwanted bodily intrusions, Article 1464, which is based on
Federal Rule 35,100 marks the limit of what constitutes an acceptable
"intrusion into the constitutionally protected 'sanctity' of the person."''
For this reason, the court order compelling physical examinations is the
most restrictive of all discovery devices.
99. This principle was used by ,the supreme court just a few months before Sudwischer
in Williams v. Smith, 576 So. 2d 448 (La. 1991). In a footnote, the court stated:
Defendants assert that even if we should conclude that an examination by a
vocational rehabilitation expert is not available under La. Code Civ. P. art.
1464, nevertheless, the trial court has the authority to appoint an expert witness
pursuant to ... the general authority under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1422 ....
We find that neither article applies because an examination not authorized under
the more restrictive discovery rules cannot be upheld under the more general
discovery or evidentiary articles.
Id. at 452 n.9 (citations omitted). Therefore, the discovery issue in Sudwischer should
have been whether Article 1464 applied, not Article 1422. See also McGowan v. Pouche,
393 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (The general La. Code Civ. P. art. 966, which
allows summary judgment without first calling expert witnesses, could riot be used to
override the more specific language of La. R.S. 9:397 which mandates that the court
consider expert testimony before dismissing a case.). See also Jones v. Thibodeaux, 445
So. 2d 44, 47 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 448 So. 2d 112 (1984) ("By adopting
the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, the legislature intended to provide
a carefully regulated evidentiary procedure having precedence over laws of general ap-
plicability.").
Although La. R.S. 9:396 is more specific than La. Code Civ. P. art. 1464, it does
not necessarily follow that La. R.S. 9:396 is rendered meaningless if Article 1464 is applied
in certain paternity actions. As the majority in Sudwischer argues, the language of La.
R.S. 9:396 does not indicate that only the mother, child, and alleged father can be tested
in all paternity cases. In other words, the two statutes are not inconsistent in application.
Interestingly, Illinois courts consider all contradictory provisions of the Paternity Act
as being subordinate to the general procedural rules of court. "[Insofar as the Blood
Test Act infringes on the power of the court to order blood tests for discovery purposes,
it is an invalid exercise of the legislative power. Where a statute conflicts with a supreme
court rule on a matter of procedure, the supreme court rule controls." Zavaleta v. Zavaleta,
358 N.E.2d 13, 16 (I11. App. 3d Dist. 1976). See alsca In re Estate of Olenick, 562 N.E.2d
293 (Iil. App. 1st Dist. 1990); People ex rel. DeVos v. Laurin, 391 N.E.2d 164 (I11. App.
5th Dist. 1979).
100. The two articles are virtually identical except that the federal rule expressly states
that the court may compel blood tests. See infra discussion concerning this difference at
text accompanying note 116.
101. Dingleman, supra note 95, at 148.
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For instance, according to Article 1471,102 any person who refuses
to produce relevant evidence pursuant to a court order may be held in
contempt of court and punished accordingly. However, the person who
refuses to submit to a mental or physical examination cannot be held
in contempt of court. Although a default judgment may be rendered
against the individual, she cannot be fined or imprisoned for choosing
not to cooperate. This provision, which only applies to Article 1464,
clearly indicates the unique character of this discovery device.
The United States Supreme Court's analysis of Federal Rule 35 is
also instructive. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,103 the Court addressed the
issue of whether Federal Rule 35 was primarily procedural in nature or
a rule of substantive law. This distinction was crucial, because according
to the Federal Rules Enabling Act'04 the Supreme Court can only pre-
scribe procedural laws, not substantive laws. Before Federal Rule 35
was adopted in 1938, a federal court could not compel parties to submit
to physical examinations unless expressly authorized by the applicable
state law. 05 At the time, state courts were divided as to the power of
a court, in the absence of a state statute, to order a physical examination
of a party."i4 By finding that Federal Rule 35, despite its impact on
the substantive rights of the individual, was a procedural regulation,
the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that Rule 35 allowed federal
courts to order physical examinations of parties. Moreover, the majority
in Sibbach found that since Congress took no "adverse action" to the
final version of Rule 35, its interpretation of that rule comported with
legislative intent.1 7
102. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1471 provides in pertinent part:
If a party .. .fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including
an order made under . . . Article 1464, the court ... may make such orders
in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: (1) [resolve
the particular matter at issue against that party] (2) An order refusing to allow
the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses ....
(3) An order ... dismissing the action . . . or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party .... (4) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders
or in addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to
obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examina-
tion .... (emphasis added).
103. 312 U.S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 422 (1940).
104. Rules Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, then provided, in pertinent part: "[T]he
Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules,
for the district courts of the United States . . . the practice and procedure in civil actions
at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant." PL. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064; 28 U.S.C. § 723 (b)(c) (subsequently repealed).
105. Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, .177 U.S. 172, 20 S. Ct. 617 (1900); Union
Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000 (1891).
106. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13, 61 S. Ct. at 426.
107. Id. at 14-16, 61 S. Ct. at 426-28.
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The four dissenters in Sibbach argued that state laws which regulated
the individual litigant's right to be free of bodily invasions, whether
termed procedural or not, were substantive in nature and therefore were
being abridged by this rule of "civil procedure."'' 0 Emphasizing the
individual's right to be free of unwanted bodily intrusions,' °9 the dissent
refused to justify the significant intrusion occasioned by such a court
order in the absence of an explicit statement of congressional intent to
the contrary. The dissent did not question that this policy determination
was within the ambit of congressional authority; it simply questioned
the majority's procedural classification of the rule. According to the
dissent, this decision was better left to Congress." 0
The sharply divided Court in Sibbach forcefully exposes the hybrid
nature of Article 1464. Despite their fundamental disagreement, both
the majority and the dissent in Sibbach concluded that before Federal
Rule 35 was enacted, a federal court lacked the authority, in the absence
of an applicable state statute, to order a party to submit to physical
examinations."' Although considered a procedural device that can be
used by the court to discover relevant information, because its use directly
invades the privacy rights of a litigant, the court should not use it
unnecessarily.
The history of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 effectively dem-
onstrates that the court in Sudwischer erroneously applied Article 1422,
rather than applying Article 1464. By ignoring Article 1464, the court
ignored the significant tension between the court's ability to compel the
disclosure of relevant evidence and the limitations placed on the court's
ability to invade the individual's person." 2 Thus considered, the discovery
108. Id. at 16-19, 61 S. Ct. at 427-29 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109. "So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy in a
matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy,
ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules for the more
uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side of the federal courts." Id.
at 18, 61 S. Ct. at 428 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
111. Of course, the dissent maintained that this was the case even after Rule 35.
112. The majority cites Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966),
as authority for the state to compel Schuh to submit to a blood test absent a physical
or religious obstacle. Although Schmerber does support this statement, given the facts of
Schmerber, the majority's cursory treatment of the case is misleading. In Schmerber, an
individual accused of driving under the influence of alcohol objected to having a sample
of blood extracted and tested to determine the degree of his intoxication. When an
individual is accused of fathering a child and sufficient evidence exists to suggest this
relationship, the use of blood tests to establish the biological link between parent and
child is justified. In a typical paternity case involving the alleged father, mother, and
child, the analogy to a criminal case is appropriate. In both instances, the individual
whose privacy will be involuntarily invaded is suspected of doing an act that triggers the
1698 [Vol. 53
NOTES
issue in Sudwischer becomes not whether Article 1422 allowed the court
order, but whether Article 1464 did. If Article 1464 had been applied,
then the court in Sudwischer should have determined whether the three
prerequisites of Article 1464 were met, namely: (1) whether Schuh was
a party to the suit; (2) whether Schuh's physical condition was "in
controversy;" and (3) whether Sudwisher demonstrated sufficient "good
cause" to warrant such a court order. Unless all three conditions are
fulfilled, the court may not compel the individual to submit to blood
testing pursuant to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. 13
2. Does "Physical Condition" Include Blood Type?
As a preliminary matter, even if the majority would have based its
authority on Article 1464, some doubt exists concerning whether or not
that article authorizes blood testing. As stated previously, Article 1464
is modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35. 114 Federal Rule 35
provides:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood
group) of a party or of a person in the custody or under the
legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which
the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical
or mental examination .... 1
Strikingly absent from Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464
is the "(including the blood group)" provision of the federal rule. Did
state's respected interests in compelling a blood test. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1,
10, 101 S. Ct. 2202, 2207 (1981) ("Although the State [Connecticut] characterizes such
proceedings [paternity actions) as 'civil,' they have 'quasi-criminal' overtones.") (citations
omitted).
In contrast, in Sudwischer the individual being ordered to undergo blood testing did
no affirmative act that precipitated the state action. The legitimate child did nothing to
compromise her privacy interest vis-a-vis the state; therefore, the majority's use of this
case to justify the minimal intrusion occasioned by a blood test is disingenuous, since
the privacy interest of the tested individual is undiminished.
113. Although a constitutional argument may be made that supports the court's order,
given that the majority based its holding on its reading of Article 1422, this discussion
is beyond the scope of this article.
114. La. R.S. 13:3783(A), which was substantially the same as present La. Code Civ.
P. art. 1464, was adopted in 1952. La. R.S. 13:3783(A) was repealed in 1960 when the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure was adopted, and was replaced by Article 1493. La.
Code Civ. P. art. 1464 was adopted in 1976 and replaced Article 1493. Except for the
"person in the custody or under the legal control of a party" provision of Article 1464,
which is based on the 1970 amendment to Federal Rule 35, the new article restates the
older ones almost verbatim. See Terrence C. Forstall, Note, Civil Procedure-Necessity
of Submitting to Physical Examination Before Filing Suit?, 15 Loy. L. Rev. 77, 78-81
(1968-69).
115. Federal R. Civ. P. 35(a) (West 1992).
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the Louisiana Legislature consider the inclusion of this provision re-
dundant, or did they purposefully omit it, thereby curtailing the court's
authority to order blood testing? Because the legislature did not clearly
express its intent and no Louisiana court has confronted this issue of
interpretation, 16 we simply do not know.
However, if the majority did interpret this omission as reflecting
the legislature's intent to not allow blood testing pursuant to Article
1464, this reading in no way justifies an invocation of Article 1422.
Again, the general statute cannot be used to render meaningless the
more specific one. Rather than read Article 1464 restrictively, the better
argument favors an interpretation that construes "physical condition"
to include an individual's blood group.
In Beach v. Beach,117 the court interpreted the newly adopted Federal
Rule 35(a), which did not then include the parenthetical "including
blood group" language, as authorizing the federal court to compel blood
tests. The appellant in Beach, a mother who was ordered to undergo
blood tests to determine whether her husband was the biological father
of her child, argued that the lower court lacked the authority to order
such testing."' After rejecting her arguments that the rule was unau-
thorized because it modified "substantive rights,"11 9 and that the rule
was only applicable in personal injury actions, 120 the court addressed
the issue of whether the word "condition" included the blood type of
a particular individual. Finding the term "condition" to be a "broad
word" that includes "characteristics" 1 21 such as one's blood type, the
court held that Federal Rule 35(a) authorized blood testing in paternity
cases.122 In light of Beach,121 given that Louisiana courts often look to
116. Moreover, no Louisiana court, except for Sudwischer, has applied either Article
1422 or 1464 as its authority to compel blood testing. However, in Williams v. Williams,
87 So. 2d 707 (La. 1956), the court was prepared to order a blood test pursuant to old
La. R.S. 13:3783 (which was similar to Article 1464), but was reluctant to apply the
statute in a disavowal action.
117. 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
118. Id. at 480.
119. The United States Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of Beach in Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 422 (1940), just months after Beach was decided.
See supra discussion at text accompanying note 103.
120. "As its [Rule 35(a)] language is unlimited, there is no reason for limiting its
effect to actions of one class." Beach, 114 F.2d at 481.
121. "The fact that blood grouping remains the same throughout life differentiates it
from some aspects of physical condition, but not from all. Blindness, for example, is as
much a factor in the physical condition of a man born blind as of one who has lost his
sigbt." Id. at 481.
122. How far the court's authority extended, that is, whether the court could order
someone other than the parents and the child to submit, was not considered by the court.
123. The "including the blood group" language of Federal Rule 35 was added in
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federal jurisprudence pertaining to the discovery articles, 124 Article 1464
should be interpreted to authorize blood tests, even though it does not
expressly so provide.
3. Was Schuh a Party?
The most problematic issue faced by the court, if Article 1464 is
applied, concerns Schuh's status as a party to the paternity suit. The
language of Article 1464 provides that only "a party, or .. .a person
in the custody or under the legal control of a party," may be compelled
to submit to a physical examination. Since Schuh was neither an agent
of the personal representative of her father's estate, nor under his
custody, the only way for the court to apply Article 1464 is if Schuh
was personally a party to the suit.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 734121 then provided:
The succession representative appointed by a court of this
state is the proper defendant in an action to enforce an obligation
of the deceased or of his succession, while the latter is under
administration. The heirs or legatees of the deceased, whether
present or represented in the state or not, need not be joined
as parties, whether the action is personal, real, or mixed. 2 6
The official comments that accompany this article state: "This article
adopts a single, simple rule in all cases: the succession representative
1970, not to authorize what was previously prohibited, but to explicitly adopt the holding
of Beach. Citing Beach as authority, the official comments to Rule 35 state that "the
[1970] amendment expressly includes blood examination within the kinds of examinations
that can be ordered under the rule." Thus, no change of law was intended by this
inclusion; Congress simply clarified then existing law.
Again, since the Louisiana Legislature failed to express why it did not include this
language in La. Code Civ. P. art. 1464, and no Louisiana court has directly addressed
this issue, the better argument is that Article 1464 authorizes blood examinations. Although
only dicta, since the court was not concerned with compelling blood tests pursuant to
Article 1464, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal recognized that the ruling of
Sibbach (see supra discussion of this case at text accompanying note 103) "has been
extended to blood tests in paternity cases and to other physical and mental examinations."
Alugas v. Halbert, 378 So. 2d 192, 193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
124. "Because the Louisiana statutes on discovery are derived from the federal rules
and contain many similar provisions, Louisiana courts, interpreting Louisiana discovery
laws, have frequently relied on federal jurisprudence under analogous federal provisions
as persuasive authority." Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 433 So.
2d 125, 129 (La. 1983). See also Williams v. Smith, 576 So. 2d 448, 450 (La. 1991);
Matherne v. Hannan, 545 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
125. See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 3249, which provides: "The succession representative
shall defend all actions brought against him to enforce claims against the succession, and
in doing so may exercise all procedural rights available to a litigant."




alone is the proper defendant. If the heirs or legatees wish to join in
order to resist the plaintiff's demand individually, they may do so
through intervention." Rosemary Hoffpauir Schuh was not the personal
representative of her father's estate, nor did she voluntarily interpose
herself as a party to the proceedings. 2 7
By the majority's own admission in Sudwischer, "Rosemary Hoffpauir
Schuh was not originally a party to this lawsuit, but she has been served
with a rule to show cause why her blood should not be tested. 1 2 The
court further describes Schuh's financial interests, as forced heir, in her
father's estate; however, the majority does not explain how Schuh's
status as forced heir transforms her into a party susceptible to Article
1464. If the legitimate heir was being ordered to disclose documentary
materials, records, or other tangible pieces of evidence, then the char-
acterization of Schuh as an interested party to the suit would be less
troublesome. 29 However, unlike the forced disclosure of tangible material
in an opposing party's possession, an order to force an individual to
submit to a blood test is a direct invasion of that individual's consti-
tutional right to be free of unwanted bodily intrusions.
An analysis of how other jurisdictions have addressed this issue
supports the proposition that Schuh, as a nonparty to the suit, should
not have been compelled to submit to testing pursuant to Article 1464.
In William M. v. Superior Court,30 where the plaintiff sought to test
the deceased's grandparents to determine paternity, the court explained
that only parties can be compelled to undergo a physical examination
or blood test according to California Code of Civil Procedure section
2032,1'1 which parallels Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464 .32
127. Sudwischei v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 475 (La. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992).
128. Id. at 475.
129. "I deem a requirement as to the invasion of the person to stand on a very
different footing from questions pertaining to the discovery of documents, pre-trial pro-
cedure and other devices for the expeditious, economic and fair conduct of litigation."
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18, 61 S. Ct. 422, 428 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
130. 275 Cal. Rptr. 103 (Ct. App. 3d 1990). For the facts of this case and a discussion
of its treatment of California's blood testing statute, see supra text accompanying note
72.
131. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 2032(a) (West 1993) provides, in pertinent part:
Any party may obtain discovery, . . . by means of a physical or mental ex-
amination of (1) a party to the action, (2) an agent of any party, or (3) a
natural person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, in any
action in which the mental or physical condition (including the blood group)
of that party or other person is in controversy in the action.
In a footnote, the court asserts that the defendant's son, since he is neither the "agent
of" nor "under the control" of the defendants, is therefore not an "other person" within
the meaning of this section. William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 105 n.l.
132. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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After interpreting the appropriate statutes pertaining to paternity suits,"'
which state that only the mother, child, and presumptive and/or alleged
fathers can be joined as parties, the court concluded that "[p]aternal
grandparents, either in their individual capacity or as parents of a
deceased putative father, are not proper parties ... to an action to
establish paternity."'13 4 Concerned with the "repercussions" of ordering
nonparties to submit to blood tests, the California court concluded that
"the decision of who may properly be made a party to mandatory
blood testing is one for the Legislature. 13 5
In Manuel v. Spector,3 6 another case involving paternal grandpar-
ents, the court, after analyzing the appropriate civil procedure article
allowing discovery of a party's "physical condition," 3 refused to order
the testing because of the nonparty status of the grandparents. The
court's analysis was very similar to that employed by the California
court in William M.,11s namely, that paternal grandparents were improper
parties to a paternity suit. "[Wie hold," wrote the court, "that [a
grandparent] is not a party whom the trial court may order to submit
to the taking of blood pursuant to either the [blood testing statute] or
Rule 167a [the discovery article]."' 3 9 Most significantly, the court in
Manuel acknowledged that without statutory authority, the court lacked
the power to compel individuals to involuntarily submit to testing. 4
In contrast to William M. and Manuel, which concluded that only
the mother, child, and alleged father are proper parties to a paternity
133. See Cal. Civ. Code § 7008 (West 1983) which provided in pertinent part: "The
natural mother, each man presumed to be the father . . ., and each man alleged to be
the natural father, may be made parties and shall be given notice of the action .... "
This statute was repealed in 1992 and replaced by Cal. Family Code § 7635 (West 1993),
operative Jan. 1, 1994), which contains essentially the same language as Cal, Civ. Code
§ 7008.
134. William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
135. Id. at 106. Cf. dissenting opinion in Sibbach discussed supra at text accompanying
note 108.
136. 712 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1986).
137. Tex. Civ. P. rule 167(a) (West 1976) provides, in pertinent part: "When the
mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party .... is in controversy,
the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or
mental examination by a physician." Although amended in 1990, the changes do not
alter the present discussion. This rule is substantially the same as La. Code Civ. P. art.
1464, except that the "including the blood group" language is absent from Article 1464.
138. Cf. "[T]he provisions of the Family Code indicate that a paternity suit involves
only the mother, alleged father and child." Manuel, 712 S.W.2d at 223. "[T]he only
people who are proper parties defendant to a paternity action are the mother, child and
any person presumed or alleged to be the father." William M. v. Superior Court, 275
Cal. Rptr. 103, 105 (Ct. App. 3d 1990).




suit and that the court is without authority to compel nonparties to
submit to testing, other courts have concluded differently. Originally,
in Voss v. Duerscherl, 41 the plaintiff's motion to compel the relatives
of the deceased alleged father was denied.1 42 In 1983, however, while
the original paternity case was still pending, the Minnesota Legislature
amended the blood testing statute to provide that in cases where the
alleged father is deceased, the court may order the parents and siblings
of the deceased to submit to blood testing "only to establish the right
of the child to public assistance including but not limited to social
security and veterans' benefits."' 43 In 1984, after the plaintiff substituted
the deceased's father as a defendant in her amended complaint, another
trial court granted her motion for blood testing of all three individuals.'"
On appeal, the motion compelling the relatives of the deceased to
undergo testing was dismissed. After an analysis of the pertinent Min-
nesota civil procedure rules, the appellate court held that the relatives
of a deceased putative father cannot be required to submit to blood
tests absent adequate service.' 45 The court's finding of improper service,
however, precluded its contemplation of other, more weighty issues.
In response to this dismissal, the mother of the child initiated another
action to determine paternity and again sought to compel the relatives
to undergo testing. The trial court directed the relative to submit, and
of course, an appeal followed. In Voss v. Duerscherl (Voss I1),' the
court addressed the issue of whether the amended statute could be applied
retroactively to the relatives. In finding that the amended section could
be applied retroactively, the court emphasized that the trial court, before
141. Voss v. Duerscherl, 384 N.W.2d 499 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
142. See supra note 87 for the procedural and factual history of this case.
143. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.62 (West 1992) was amended in 1983 to read, in pertinent
part:
If the alleged father is dead, the court may, and upon request of a party shall,
require the decedent's parents or brothers and sisters or both to submit to blood
tests. However, in a case involving these relatives of an alleged father, who is
deceased, the court may refuse to order blood tests if the court makes an
express finding that submitting to the tests presents a danger to the health of
one or more of these relatives that outweighs the child's interest in having the
tests performed. Unless the person gives consent to the use, the results of any
blood tests of the decedent's parents, brothers, or sisters may be used only to
establish the right of the child to public assistance including but not limited to
social security and veterans' benefits.
144. Voss 1, 384 N.W.2d at 501.
145. Id. at 503.
146. 408 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 425 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1988).
For the discussion of this reversal, see infra text accompanying notes 152-154. Although
Voss II has been reversed and has no precedential value in Minnesota, the reasoning
employed by the appellate court merits discussion, if for no other reason than to avoid
similar confusion in Louisiana.
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the 1983 amendment went into effect, had the authority to order the
relatives to undergo blood testing pursuant to Minnesota Civil Procedure
Rule 35.01.147 The appellate court supported its contention by citing a
Minnesota Supreme Court case which held that parties to a paternity
action fall within the ambit of Rule 35.01.'48 The court maintained that
the relatives were proper parties to the original suit by analogizing
paternity actions to declaratory judgments brought under Minnesota
law.' 49 Specifically, Minnesota statute § 555.11 then provided: "When
declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration . . . ." 11
Since the relatives did have a financial interest in the paternity suit, the
court had the authority to treat them as parties, thereby subjecting them
to Rule 35.01.'1' Thus, the court in Voss II affirmed the lower court
and ordered the testing of the relatives.
The appellate court's holding in Voss II, however, was reversed on
appeal.' 52 In Voss III, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that after the
putative father's death, the plaintiff's paternity action only survived
against the personal representative of the estate. Since the personal
representative of Duerscherl's estate was discharged before an adjudi-
cation was made, the estate's liability was terminated. 5 3 "[W]e hold
that this paternity action did not survive against the father and siblings
of the deceased putative father and that they are not proper parties to
the paternity action.' ' 54 Thus, despite the appellate court's attempt to
147. Minn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 (West 1993) (amended 1988), which is similar to La.
Code Civ. P. art. 1464, provides: "In an action in which . . . the blood relationship of
a party ... is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the
party to submit to ... blood examinations by a physician." Notice that the Minnesota
provision, unlike its Louisiana counterpart, explicitly provides for the testing of blood
samples.
148. Voss 11, 408 N.W.2d at 166 (citing State ex rel. Hastings v. Denny, 296 N.W.2d
378, 380 (Minn. 1980)).
149. Id. at 165-66.
150. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 555.11 (West 1988). See infra note 155 for text of La. Code
Civ. P. art. 1880 which is identical to its Minnesota counterpart and is modeled on the
same Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
151. Additionally, the court stated that because the relatives in Voss I argued that
they were proper parties according to amended Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.62 and, as such,
were entitled to certain substantive rights, it is unacceptable for them to take a "con-
tradictory" position on appeal. Voss II, 408 N.W.2d at 165. The court's argument seems
spurious, however, since the court in Voss I did not address the appellants' alternative
complaint regarding the improper retroactive application of the 1983 amendment. It is
inequitable for the court in Voss II to force a successful alternative argument made in
Voss I upon an unreceptive appellant.
152. Voss v. Duerscherl, 425 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1988).
153. See supra text accompanying note 125 for discussion of La. Code Civ. P. art.
734.
154. Voss II, 425 N.W.2d at 831.
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make the relatives of the deceased parties to the paternity action through
the use of Minnesota Statute section 555.11, the relatives were not forced
to submit to testing.
This suggestion of Voss II, although ultimately ineffective, proves
to be very provocative, considering that Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure article 1880,111 which pertains to the parties of a declaratory
judgment, is identical to its Minnesota counterpart.5 6 Perhaps Article
1880 is the missing procedural link that unites the legal heir to her
father's estate, thereby making her a party to the suit and susceptible
to Article 1464. In future cases involving the testing of others than the
mother, child, and alleged father, the plaintiff should bring a declaratory
action and specifically name all those who have an interest in the case
as parties. This might allow the court to analogize accordingly and
invoke Article 1464 to compel testing. However, given that the Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's application of Minnesota
Statute Annotated section 555.11, the better argument remains that Schuh
was not a proper party defendant in an action to determine paternity.
4. Was Schuh's Physical Condition "In Controversy?"
While the analogy to declaratory judgments may enable the court
to characterize the unavailable parent's relative as a "party" to the
action, a question remains as to whether this purely procedural classi-
fication suffices to make Article 1464 applicable. 5 7 In both William M.
and Manuel, the courts found that only the blood group of the deceased
alleged father was "in controversy" in the paternity action-not the
blood group of the alleged father's parents.'58 "Any testing of defen-
dants' [the paternal grandparents'] blood is collateral to the issue before
the trial court."15 9 Thus, a determination as to an individual's party
155. "When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding." La. Code Civ. P. art.
1880.
156. See also Hibbs v. Chandler, 684 S.W.2d 310 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (Not addressing
the "in controversy" requirement of Ky. CR 35.01 (Baldwin 1987), which was identical
to Federal Rule 35, the court deemed the grandparents of their deceased son's alleged
child to be "parties" to the paternity suit, since all heirs are liable for the debts of the
decedent, under Kentucky law, if any assets exist.).
157. Especially given Voss III. See supra text accompanying notes 152-154 for dis-
cussion. The court in Voss III, however, was concerned only with the procedural status
of the deceased's relatives, and did not address the proper application of Minn. Civ. P.
rule 35.01. Voss II, 425 N.W.2d at 831.
158. William M. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 103, 105 (Ct. App. 3d 1990);
Manuel v. Spector, 712 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1986).
159. William M., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
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status is contingent on her blood type, or her DNA profile, being "in
controversy."
A similar issue regarding the party status of an individual was
considered in a 1955 federal appellate decision. In Fong Sik Leung v.
Dulles,'"° a minor Oriental child asserted his American citizenship by
proclaiming that his alleged father, Fong Sik Leung (who was also his
guardian ad litum), was an American citizen.' 6' The defendant, the
Secretary of State acting on behalf of the United States, denied the
child's American citizenship and filed a motion under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 35 for the court to compel the father and son to submit
to blood tests.' 62 Although the child was tested, the father refused to
submit, and the district court dismissed the suit.
The child appealed, contending that the district court lacked authority
to order his guardian, a non-party to the suit', to submit to testing and
that the court therefore had erroneously dismissed the suit. The appellate
court agreed and reversed the lower court's judgment. Although all three
appellate judges concurred in the result, the judges differed as to the
rationale behind their decision.
The Chief Judge, after finding that only the child was a party to
the action, 63 chastised the district court for, in effect, ordering a non-
party to submit to testing and then dismissing the suit because the
individual rightfully refused to comply with its order. The Chief Judge
stressed that without Federal Rule 35 a federal court has no inherent
authority to compel any individual, party or not, to submit to blood
testing.' 64 Because Rule 35 only applies to "parties," which Fong Sik
Leung was not, the district court lacked authority either to order him
to submit or, a fortiori, to draw a negative inference from his refusal. 65
The concurring judges refused to address the issue of whether the
court lacked authority without Federal Rule 35 to order blood tests.' s"
However, and more importantly, they did conclude that Fong Sik Leung
was not a party to the suit pursuant to Rule 35.167 Relying on the
160. 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955).
161. Id. at 75.
162. Id. at 79-80 (Boldt, J., concurring).
163. "It seems clear that there were not two parties to this . . . proceeding. The child
petitioner is the only person seeking relief. . . . The fact that a guardian is subject to
certain controls of the court no more makes him a party subject to the blood test than
it does a party litigant's attorney, whose blood condition may be a relevant fact in the
case." Id. at 76.
164. He based his opinion on a reading of Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 11 S. Ct. 1000 (1891); Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172, 20 S.
Ct. 617 (1900); and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 422 (1940).
165. Fong Sik Leung, 226 F.2d at 77-78.
166. Id. at 81 n.4 (Boldt, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 81-82 (Boldt, J., concurring).
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mandate of Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the
rules should be given a broad and liberal construction to assure justice,
the concurring judges read the word "party" to include "one concerned
with, conducting, or taking part in any matter or proceeding, whether
he is named or participates as a formal party or not.' ' 68 Despite this
broad reading of "party," the concurring judges refused to classify Fong
Sik Leung as a "party" as that word is specifically used in Rule 35.
After studying the history and context of Rule 35, the concurring judges
found "the rule makers intended that only those parties whose physical
or mental condition is directly in controversy in the particular action
can be required to submit to examination in so far as Rule 35 is
concerned."' 69 Thus, even though the blood of Fong Sik Leung would
have provided the court with relevant evidence as to the child's citi-
zenship, since his blood 'type was not at issue in the suit, the court
lacked the authority to order the father to undergo tests.
The concurring opinions stand for the proposition that even if
"party" is read broadly to include individuals other than the mother,
child, or alleged -father, in order for Federal Rule 35 to apply (and by
analogy Article 1464), this individual's blood type must be at issue.
Thus, the party and "in controversy" requirements converge and should
not be considered separately. Following this reasoning, neither an in-
dividual considered a "party" because of her status as succession rep-
resentative nor the individual who has an interest in the declaratory
judgment would be a "party" pursuant to Article 1464. This strict
interpretation of Article 1464 effectively makes only the mother, child,
and alleged father proper parties to any filiation action because the
blood type of any other individual, although possibly relevant, is not
strictly at issue in a paternity case.
Accepting this reading of Article 1464, even if Schuh was considered
a party to the suit, her DNA profile would not be "in controversy"
according to the Louisiana rules of civil procedure. In Sudwischer, only
the decedent's DNA profile was at issue. Although characterized by the
majority as "relevant evidence" subject to the general rules of discovery,
the actual purpose of this court order was to facilitate Sudwisher's
filiation action against the decedent, Paul Hoffpauir. By focusing on a
desired result instead of the pertinent rules of discovery, the majority
circumvents the problematic fact that Schuh would not be classified as
a party whose blood type is "in controversy" in any filiation action
brought by Sudwisher. In short, the majority creates a quasi-paternity
suit, in which legitimate heirs are parties, in order to obtain evidence
that would otherwise be inaccessible.
168. Id. at 81 (Boldt, J., concurring).
169. Id. (Boldt, J., concurring).
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5. Did Sudwisher Demonstrate "Good Cause?"
Despite Justice Lemmon's concurring opinion that suggests as much,
the supreme court should have explicitly stated that a preliminary showing
of good cause is required before any blood tests are ordered. Good
cause is shown when relevant evidence is not available from any other
source. Although arguably the plaintiff in Sudwischer met this standard,
because the testing of Schuh could result in unique and probative ev-
idence concerning Hoffpauir's parentage, by not mandating such a pre-
liminary showing the majority opinion invites fraudulent paternity claims.
Without a prerequisite showing, little would prevent greedy individuals
from insisting on their biological link to a wealthy decedent in the hope
of proving filiation through mistake or pure chance, or from simply
forcing the legitimate heirs to settle quietly. 70
C. Conclusion: The Interrelation of Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396(A) and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Articles 1422
and 1464
At least four possible avenues exist regarding the interrelation of
the blood testing statute and the discovery articles. Some courts 7' give
great deference to the legislative will underlying blood testing statutes,
stressing that the court should not invade the privacy interests of the
individual unless the court has explicit statutory authority. Unless the
blood testing statute provides for the testing sought by a petitioner,
then the court has no authority to order the individual to submit to
testing. These courts refuse to classify the decedent's relatives as "par-
ties" to the suit whose blood group is "in controversy" and thereby
refuse to apply the discovery article that authorizes the court to order
blood tests. This strict interpretation is adopted by Justice Cole. 72
The "[nlotwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary" lan-
guage of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396(A) is not addressed in Sud-
wischer. Simply stated, this common provision causes the statute that
uses it to preempt all other statutes that could conceivably be applied
170. These considerations caused the Louisiana Supreme Court, in In re J.M., 590
So. 2d 565, 571 (La. 1991), just two months after Sudwischer, to conclude:
According[ly] ... we interpret La. R.S. 9:396 so as to render it constitutional
by reading into the statute a requirement for a show cause hearing. In the show
cause hearing, before the statute is triggered and a court order for blood testing
issued, the moving party must first show that there is a reasonable possibility
of paternity.
171. See In re Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (Ct. App. 4th 1992); William
M. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 103 (App. 3d 1990).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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in its stead.' This language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 was
one of the few modifications that the Louisiana Legislature made to
the Uniform Act when adopting it in 1972.174 This modification expresses
the legislature's intent that "in any civil action in which paternity is a
relevant fact," Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396-398 should be applied. 75
Given this legislative intent, the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396(A) supersede the general rules of discovery, including Articles 1422
and 1464. Thus, it can be argued that unless Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396(A) is used to either authorize or prohibit a blood test in a filiation
action, any discussion of other statutes is superfluous.
Other courts'7 6 take a more moderate course, finding that the blood
testing statute does not preclude the court from ordering relatives to
undergo testing, provided they are parties to the suit. Thus, if a relative
is made a party to the suit, either through analogy to a declaratory
action or a broad construction of the word "party," the court can
invoke its authority vested in the discovery article based on Federal Rule
35 and order such testing. Although not stated in Justice Dennis' dissent,
the inference that he and Chief Justice Calogero support this course of
action is fairly drawn from their emphasis of Schuh's nonparty status.
A third approach to this problem is reflected by the majority and
Justice Lemmon's interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396 and
Code of Civil Procedure article 1422. Not only did the court find 9:396
inapplicable, but it relied on the general authority found in Article 1422
to compel a nonparty to submit to testing. This decidedly innovative
interpretation of judicial authority, however, improperly avoids Article
1464 and undermines the coherent structure of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure. Moreover, to maintain that the court has the inherent
power to invade the privacy interests of nonparties is to violate an
essential mandate of the Louisiana Civil Code,' 7 since Article 1464, if
173. "At the beginning of the first section of the Act [La. R.S. 9:396-398] is the
familiar proviso negating any other provision of law to the contrary." McGowan v. Poche,
393 So. 2d 278, 280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
174. Cf. La. R.S. 9:396 with the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity
§ 1 in supra notes 31 and 32.
175. See Jones v. Thibodeaux, 445 So. 2d 44, 47 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) ("By
adopting the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, the legislature intended
to provide a carefully regulated evidentiary procedure having precedence over laws of
general applicability.").
176. See Voss v. Duerscherl (Voss 1), 384 N.W.2d 499 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Manuel
v. Spector, 712 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1986). But see Voss v. Duerscherl
(Voss II), 425 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1988), which rejected this reasoning.
177. "The sources of law are legislation and custom." La. Civ. Code art. 1. "Leg-
islation is a solemn expression of legislative will." La. Civ. Code art. 2. "[A]s in all
codified systems, legislation is the superior source of law in Louisiana." Comment (d)
to La. Civ. Code art. 3. It could be argued that La. R.S. 9:396(A) does not apply given
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not Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396, clearly restricts the court's au-
thority to compel blood tests.
A fourth possible avenue, as of yet untried, is to argue that Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396(A) authorizes the testing of relatives when a parent
is unavailable: Although a strong argument supports a restrictive reading
of the statute, this strict interpretation is inextricably linked to the
original purposes of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity. Since the new technology of DNA typing is capable of proving
paternity with a degree of probability that approaches certainty, 17  even
when relatives of the absent parent are tested, perhaps a reliance on
this outdated rationale is no longer appropriate. By stressing the recent
amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396,179 which clearly reflect
a legislative intent to keep up with scientific progress, it could be argued
that the "on behalf of any person whose blood is involved" provision
of the statute authorizes the court to compel blood tests of individuals
other than those expressly enumerated therein. This argument, however,
does not readily comport with the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396(A) and is not overly persuasive.
Of the four possible routes, only two, although they produce contrary
results, withstand careful scrutiny: (1) a strict reading of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:396 that finds the article applicable, thereby precluding
any inquiry into the discovery articles and allowing the court to compel
only the mother, child, and alleged father, whether they are parties or
the facts of Sudwischer (indeed, this is argued by all of the Justices of the Louisiana
Supreme Court with the exception of Justice Cole), and therefore the court, unable to
look to customary practice, should have simply decided the matter equitably pursuant to
La. Civ. Code art. 4: "When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide
equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages." In a strong sense,
the court's constitutional analysis of the issue (which is beyond the scope of this note)
suggests that both the majority and dissent favored this equitable approach. (Although
Justice Lemmon argued strongly that Article 1422 permitted the discovery of Schuh's
blood, he also specifically argued that "fundamental fairness" dictated that Schuh should
be forced to submit to testing. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 477
(La. 1991) (Lemmon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992).). However,
just because a specific evidentiary statute is deemed inapplicable, the court cannot ignore
the legislative dictates of the more general evidentiary rules. Aware of this, the majority
in Sudwischer invoked Article 1422 instead of Article 1464 to authorize its court order.
It is the majority's erroneous choice that is the focus of this note.
178. In no case can paternity be established with complete certainty. See infra text
accompanying note 189.
179. 1992 La. Acts No. 407, § 1, expressly provided that "tissue samples" in addition
to blood samples may be tested. 1985 La. Acts No. 38, § 1, substituted "the drawing
of blood samples and shall direct that inherited characteristics in the samples, including




not, to undergo blood testing; or (2) reading Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396(A) to apply only in cases where the mother, child, or alleged
father are available for testing, thereby triggering Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 1464, which allows the court to compel testing
of parties if certain prerequisites are met. Although the route taken by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Sudwischer is the present law in this
state, any future journeys should not involve Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1422.
III. DNA TESTING
The underlying theory of DNA testing,8 0 that no two individuals'
have the same genetic structure, is generally accepted by the scientific
community.8 2 The procedural hazards involved in performing these com-
plicated tests, however, are still susceptible to attack in the court room.8 3
Recently, commentators have also challenged the frequency of genetic
similarities within certain ethnic groups which could skew the statistical
data relied upon to determine the probability that a "random man,"
rather than the tested individual, was the child's father.' l Putting these
180. All the heritable information that is passed from parent to child is contained in
the complex DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecule. These long, chain-like molecules,
which consist of millions of pairs of nucleotide base pairs, are found in the nucleus of
most cells (excluding red blood cells, which do not have a nucleus) of all living organisms.
Within a particular individual, however, this extremely long DNA sequence is the same
in every cell of her body. The individualized nature of the person's DNA coupled with
statistical data showing the incidence of particular genes within an ethnic group accounts
for the heightened degree of probability with which experts can determine the alleged
father's paternity. This is the basis of DNA typing. Jeffrey A. Norman, Note, DNA
Fingerprinting: Is it Ready for Trial?, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 243 (1990).
These intertwined DNA chains form "chromosomes," of which every individual has
twenty-three. Each one consists of a pair of "homologous," or duplicate, chromosomes.
The mother contributes one homologous chromosome, and the father the other. William
C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 Va. L. Rev. 45, 61 n.76 (1989).
181. Except for identical twins. William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Testing:
Debate Update, Trial 52, 61 (April 1992).
182. First described in J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic
Acid: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 Nature 737 (1953), the basic structure
of DNA is unanimously accepted by the scientific community. Thompson & Ford, supra
note 180, at 60-61.
183. For a thorough discussion of the many procedural problems associated with this
complex scientific process, see Blakesley, supra note 8, at Part II, Ch. 6.
184. In contrast to procedural problems concerning DNA testing, which revolve around
mechanical or human error, this criticism is directed at the method of determining the
statistical probabilities that are crucial to an accurate "probability" figure.
General population statistics may ... be highly misleading, critics say, in criminal
cases involving inferences of paternity and cases where a missing person's DNA
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significant issues aside, and assuming for the purposes of this casenote
that when properly conducted DNA testing is an accurate means of
revealing a common relative, the purpose of this section is to discuss
a number of legal issues raised by using DNA typing to determine
paternity when an alleged parent is unavailable for testing.'8
A. Is DNA Typing an Effective Legal Means of Establishing
Paternity When an Alleged Parent is Unavailable for Testing?
1. DNA Typing
The type of DNA testing sought in Sudwischer is called RFLP 8 6
analysis. Also known as DNA typing, or DNA fingerprinting, this pro-
cedure allows the analyst to create a "print" of a person's genetic
pattern as found in DNA extracted from the person's blood or tissue
sample.'8 7 This "print," which resembles a bar code, can be compared
to other individuals' prints for purposes of determining whether the
parties are related. Given that each person's genetic structure is appar-
print must be deduced from relatives' prints .... The procedures used by some
laboratories have been criticized for underestimating the frequency of particular
DNA print bands .... Critics say that "structuring" of human populations,
with certain DNA patterns occurring more often in some ethnic, religious, and
geographic subgroups than others. If there is such structuring, multiplying band
frequencies could produce severe errors.
Thompson & Ford, supra note 181, at 57.
But according to Dr. J. Craig Cohen, the DNA expert involved in the Sudwischer
case, such criticisms, even if true, only minimally affect the ability of DNA tests to prove
paternity.
The effect that [underestimating the frequency of certain ethnic substructures]
has is on the last digit, the third digit of the number. So if I have a value of
say, 99.9, that substructure can affect the last digit, that point nine. So instead
of having 99.9, I could have 99.7, or 99.5. And that is where we get into
problems, that last digit.
Cohen Interview, supra note 27.
185. The more technical scientific and statistical aspects of DNA typing are beyond
the scope of this paper. For an in-depth scientific explanation of DNA typing, see
Thompson & Ford, supra note 180. For a less detailed description, see Ronald J. Richards,
Comment, DNA Fingerprinting and Paternity Testing, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 594 (1989);
Stephen C. Petrovich, Note, DNA Typing: A Rush to Judgment, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 669
(1990); Cassandra Franklin-Barbajosa, The New Science of Identity, National Geographic,
May 1992, at 112.
186. "Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms." For a thorough explanation of
the process involved in RFLP analysis, see Thompson & Ford, supra note 181, at 64-76.
187. Thompson & Ford, supra note 181, at 74; Petrovich, supra note 185, at 672.
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ently unique'8 and the role that DNA plays in heredity, such a com-
parison can establish family blood lines with extreme precision when
the mother, child, and alleged father are tested.8 9 Although sophisticated
blood grouping tests arguably may also prove paternity, modern DNA
testing makes even the most advanced blood tests obsolete because DNA
testing is capable of revealing the individual's unique genetic structure.,90
Significantly, with the advent of DNA testing came the ability of experts
to prove paternity by testing relatives of an unavailable parent.' 91 This
article does not attempt to refute the scientific capabilities of DNA
fingerprinting; instead, it focuses on the legal ramifications of this new
technology which were not adequately addressed in the Sudwischer opin-
ion. 192
188. "The probability that any individual will have a particular DNA fingerprint is
the product of the probabilities of the occurrence of a specific allele at each locus. It is
very slight; the figure most often cited is 1 in 30 billion." Harry D. Krause, Family Law:
Cases, Comments, and Questions, 980 (3d ed. 1990) (quoting Beverly Merz, DNA Fin-
gerprints Come to Court, 259 J.A.M.A. 2139 (1988)).
189. Thompson & Ford, supra note 181, at 45. In no case, however, can DNA testing
establish paternity with 100% certainty.
190. Richards, supra note 185, at 613. The individualized nature of the person's DNA
coupled with statistical data showing the incidence of particular genes within a ethnic
group accounts for the heightened degree of probability with which experts can determine
the alleged father's paternity. It is worth noting, however, that the operative principle of
traditional blood testing is the same as that used in DNA fingerprinting-the primary
difference being the discriminating power of DNA testing.
191. Although certain types of blood tests are also capable of establishing paternity
by testing relatives of the missing parent, these tests lack the ability to establish paternity
with as high a degree of probability as the new DNA tests. Even with DNA testing,
however, an analyst can only establish a "probability" of paternity-not the fact of
paternity. See Richards, supra note 185, at 613-20, for other advantages associated with
DNA typing.
192. Another test, Polymerase Chain Reaction, or PCR Amplification, can be used
to compare the genetic makeup of two individuals. PCR analysis replicates the DNA
found in a tissue sample to determine if a specific "allele" is present. Because relatively
small samples of DNA can be used in PCR analysis, it is well suited for forensic use.
The extreme sensitivity of PCR testing, however, makes it more susceptible to procedural
attacks at trial. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 181, at 76-79; Petrovich, supra note
185, at 679-703.
If necrotic tissue is available, PCR testing can be used to determine the probability
of paternity, but "the discriminating power of that test is not the equivalent of RFLP."
Furthermore, Dr. Cohen advises that forensic and parentage testing should not be readily
equated.
A problem is that they equate forensic testing with parentage testing. They really
aren't related. They use the same technology, but the difference is with a forensic
test you start off with a minimal sample . . . so only one person can do the
test. . . . You usually use up the whole [sample]. In parentage testing, samples
are available for reexamination ... for confirmation.
Cohen Interview, supra note 27.
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2. How Relevant are DNA Test Results When Relatives are
Tested?
In his concurring opinion in Sudwischer, Justice Lemmon writes,
"[w]hile the information, depending upon the results, may not be ad-
missible at trial, the present issue is discoverability and not admissibi-
lity. ' 9" In order for this assertion to be correct the evidence sought
must at least be probative; however, some debate exists concerning the
probative value of comparing the DNA fingerprints of two alleged
relatives to determine the paternity of a missing parent. 94 When an
alleged parent is unavailable, DNA testing resembles a fishing expedition;
that is, in contrast to a criminal case or a typical paternity case where
both parents and the child are tested, when alleged relatives are tested,
the analyst is not looking for a positive identification of specific genes,
but rather reels in whatever "matches" she happens to catch. By com-
paring the prints of two alleged relatives, the analyst hopes to discover
any shared genes that may have been contributed by a common relative;
she does not simply compare two prints to see if they match.
Stated differently, unlike a typical paternity suit where the results
are directly relevant to the issue of paternity, here the results of the
DNA tests are only conditionally relevant. If a match is found, then
the tests may be relevant. The ability of the DNA analyst to assert the
probability that the tested individuals are or are not related is dependent,
to some degree, on luck. 195 When the mother, child, and alleged father
are tested, the results will either exclude the father with certainty, or
include the father with a degree of certainty dependent only on the type
of test used.'9 With the testing of a relative of the unavailable parent,
193. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 476 (La. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992).
194. Indeed, some debate still exists concerning the ability of DNA typing to prove
paternity when both parents and the child are tested. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at Part
II, Ch. 6.
195. "Not having the missing parent makes it ... more difficult, so what happens
is, when you look at a case like this [Sudwischer], that's why I say it could be as low
as one in five and as high as one in a hundred thousand [Sudwischer, 589 So. 2d at
475.]; it has a little to do with luck .... ." Cohen Interview, supra note 27.
196. Again, the ability of DNA tests to prove paternity is still the subject of debate.
See generally Thompson & Ford, supra note 181. See also Tim Beardsley, DNA Finger-
printing Reconsidered (Again), 267 Scientific American 26 (July 1992):
[D]efense lawyers are using some of the [National] [R]esearch Council's less
well-publicized conclusions to try to overturn convictions won on the basis of
DNA fingerprinting evidence .... One of the recommendations of the panel
that has attracted the attention ... is that fingerprinting tests showing a phe-
nomenon called band shifting be declared "inconclusive" until laboratories have
performed adequate studies on the effect.
But see supra note 192, where Dr. Cohen suggests that the problems which hamper forensic
testing are not identical to those involved in paternity testing.
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however, a finding that the two individuals do not share any common
genes fails to exclude the possibility that the alleged father is the ille-
gitimate child's biological parent. At least five rational explanations
account for this inability to exclude the possibility of paternity, all of
which have legal implications.
First, an important aspect of DNA typing when an alleged parent
is unavailable for testing concerns the number of relatives tested to
prove paternity. That is, the more relatives of the alleged parent who
are tested, the greater the ability of analysts to estimate the probability
of paternity. By analyzing the blood of the decedent's parents, siblings,
and children, an analyst can compare the various DNA fingerprints and,
in effect, better evaluate the missing person's genetic profile.'9 If, for
instance, only two suspected relatives are tested, the test results are not
as likely to produce probative evidence as when three or more relatives
are tested.
Analogously, every individual's DNA fingerprint represents another
piece of the family puzzle. While it is possible for experts to determine
paternity by testing only two pieces, the more pieces available for ex-
amination, the more accurate the determination. Following this reason-
ing, and accepting the applicability of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1422, not only could relatives with a financial interest in the
litigation be compelled to undergo blood tests, but all relatives capable
of providing relevant evidence could be ordered by the court to submit.
Does the majority in Sudwischer intend to suggest that the court may
compel these disinterested nonparties to submit to testing, especially
when they have nothing personally at stake in the litigation? By using
a "relevancy" standard, the scope of who may be compelled to submit
to blood testing is quite broad, and in any case, remains undefined. 9
Although in Sudwischer'9 relatives of the plaintiff were willing to
submit voluntarily to blood testing, this fortuitous fact has no bearing
197. [With] a deceased relative, the ideal thing is to have his mother and father.
From his mother and father I can establish it [paternity], just like that, no
problem. From his mother and father I have all of his constituent genes, and
I know what could have been passed. Now, once his mother and father are
gone, at that point you have to start building up a large number of people to
really insure success. So ideally, you have to have multiple sisters, multiple
[relatives].
Cohen Interview, supra note 27.
198. The court could adopt an ad hoc standard based on the availability of a requisite
number of relatives. That is, only in cases where there are at least two blood relatives
available for testing, in addition to the parties themselves, will the court order anyone
to submit to testing. Or the court could limit DNA testing to only the parents of the
alleged mother or father. Cf. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.62 supra at note 143.
199. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir 589 So. 2d 474, 475 (La. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992).
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on future cases." ° In the next case involving this issue, perhaps no
relatives will even exist, or, more likely, relatives of the reluctant party
will refuse to submit voluntarily to testing. Will the court then order
these relatives to submit? Where should the court draw the line on its
authority to compel "relevant evidence?"
The second explanation belying the inability of DNA testing to
exclude the chance of paternity concerns the possibility that the legitimate
child was fathered by someone other than her legal father.20' If this is
the case, then the DNA test would prove nothing directly and could
instead, if admitted at trial, implicitly prove a falsehood. That is, if no
matches between the two alleged half-sisters are found, it is logical to
assume that the alleged father is not the father of the illegitimate child,
even though he may be. The illegitimate child, by assuming that most
legitimate children are conceived by a union of their legal parents, bears
the risk of this negative implication.
In this case, could the illegitimate child present evidence showing
that the legitimate child was born of an adulterous union, or was
adopted, or that her mother was artificially inseminated? Such evidence,
despite its personal nature, would tend to explain why the DNA tests
did not prove that the two are related and, hence, would constitute
relevant evidence. Thus considered, individuals other than the relatives
directly involved in the litigation could become embroiled in a paternity
suit that only indirectly affects them-if at all.
The problem of assuming a biological link to the unavailable parent
is not isolated to parent-child relationships. In cases where the indivi-
dual's siblings or parents undergo testing, the presumption that the legal
relatives are in fact biologically related is just that-a presumption. 202
Although DNA testing is able to verify a relationship if one exists, if
the tested individuals are not biologically related, a strong chance of
drawing negative inferences from inconclusive test results persists.
200. The availability of Sudwisher's relatives, however, does not drastically increase
the analyst's ability to prove paternity. Although the DNA fingerprint of Sudwisher can
be compared to her siblings' to isolate better her mother's genes and to prove or disprove
that she and her siblings shared a common father, the only way to link Hoffpauir to
both Sudwisher and Schuh is to compare the DNA fingerprints of the two alleged half-
sisters. For this purpose, more relatives of Schuh, who were presumably unavailable,
would have been more helpful.
201. "The problem with descendants is that ... you're assuming that he is the father
of those children. In something like five thousand parentage tests over the last four years,
my rule of thumb is that I'm not going to make presumptions." Cohen Interview, supra
note 27.
202. For this reason, DNA experts, like Dr. Cohen, do not presume that the relatives
are related, but instead prove it. "When I test grandparents, I don't assume that the
grandfather is the father ... is the true [biological] father-I prove this in my analysis ....
I never assume fatherhood in the lab." Id.
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Third, it is theoretically possible for DNA testing to fail to reveal
any relationship, not because the two are unrelated, but because the
alleged father contributed his genes in such a way as to conceal his
paternity. 20 3 Every individual, viewed as a prospective parent, resembles
a binary creature; that is, when reproducing, every person contributes
to her offspring genes that were inherited either from her mother or
her father. Thus, stated simply, the parent, at any given gene locus,
has a fifty percent chance of contributing a gene she inherited from
her mother, and a fifty percent chance of contributing a gene she received
from her father. When both biological parents and the child are tested,
all constituent genes are accounted for; therefore, at every locus tested,
the child will possess genes that can be traced to her biological parents.
If at one site the child possesses a gene that is not found in either
tested parent, then at least one of the parents is necessarily excluded
from being the child's biological parent.
But when an alleged parent is unavailable for testing, all the con-
stituent genes are not accounted for, and it therefore becomes more
difficult to determine paternity. To compensate for this, more gene sites
are tested, since the likelihood of discovering a match increases with
every additional gene analyzed. 204 Conceivably, however, when distant
relatives are tested without the benefit of having the missing relative's
genetic profile, if at every locus examined the alleged parent contributed
the opposite gene to the tested siblings, then no biological link will be
revealed-even though the child and alleged parent are in fact related. 20 5
Because of this remote chance, DNA testing is unable to exclude the
alleged parent with certainty. 20 6
This contingency also accounts for the inability of the expert to
predict the level of probability that may result even if a match is found.
203. This does not present a significant problem when several relatives are tested.
204. "What one does in that case [where a parent is missing], is you do more genes.
So with a man and his child, I would only do three or four. If I have a spouse ... a
sibling and a child, then I might have to do five, six, seven, eight genes to see if there
is any relationship." Cohen Interview, supra note 27.
205. For instance, if two half-siblings are tested (as in Sudwischer) who allegedly share
a common parent, the genes contributed by the missing parent who possesses genes A
and B, could be contributed as follows: To child I at locus 1, the parent contributed
gene A. To child 2 at locus 1, the parent contributed gene B. If at every locus tested,
the alleged parent contributed the opposite gene to each child, and only these two half-
siblings are tested, then DNA typing will at least be inconclusive.
206. For example, a child with gene A at a tested locus seeks to prove relation to
an unavailable alleged father. The biological mother is tested and has genes B and C at
that same locus. Other presumed relatives are tested and have genes D, E, F and G. No
one who is tested possesses gene A. Nevertheless, such results do not inevitably lead to
the conclusion that the alleged father did not possess gene A. The only sure way to
disprove the alleged father's paternity in this case is to test both of his biological parents
and find that neither of them possesses gene A.
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In Sudwischer, for instance, the DNA expert was only able to state that
"Itihe probability index could be as low as one in five or as high as
one in a hundred thousand." '207 In contrast, when both parents are
tested, the probability of paternity, as expressed in a percentage, will
either approach one hundred percent or zero percent. 208 Again, given
the uniqueness of every individual's genetic makeup and the unlikelihood
that two unrelated individuals would just happen to share a common
gene, once one match is found, it becomes probable that the two share
a common relative. But if no match is found, then the converse, that
the two are not related, does not necessarily follow.
Fourth, the two individuals could be related, not because they share
a parent, but because they share a distant common relative. If the tested
individuals are distantly related, then the statistics used to calculate the
probability of paternity will be misleading, since the likelihood of two
relatives sharing a common gene is significantly higher than the prob-
ability of two unrelated individuals sharing the same gene. 2 9 For instance,
if two biological cousins are tested, who are erroneously thought to be
related only through the alleged parent if at all, the likelihood of
discovering a match is increased, since the two share common genes
contributed from distant relatives-genes that would not be present in
two unrelated individuals. This is particularly problematic in smaller
communities where the incidence of intermarriage is common. 10
207. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 475 (La. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992).
208. Test results proclaiming a 99+ percent probability of paternity are prone to
misinterpretation. This percentage does not exactly mean that there exists a 99+ percent
chance that the alleged father is the child's parent. Rather, this percentage represents a
comparison of how well the father and child "matched" and the incidence of the gene
allegedly contributed by the father within the father's ethnic group. For a helpful analysis
of this often confusing concept, see Blakesley, supra note 8, at Part II, Ch. 6.
209. "[Statistics] are based on random frequencies in the population.... That is one
thing that you must rule out, that all these people are unrelated. I eliminate 99 percent
of all males unrelated to the absent parent." Cohen Interview, supra note 27.
210. For instance, in Iota, Louisiana, scientists contend that the small community's
history of intermarriage accounts for the high percentage of children born there with Tay-
Sachs, a rare and deadly genetic disease traceable to Ashkenazi Jews. In the eighteenth
century, according to one theory, two families of Ashkenazi Jews who carried the Tay-
Sachs gene settled in Louisiana and proliferated the deadly gene among their French-
Canadian neighbors through intermarriage:
"In these little communities you find people stayed and intermarried for gen-
erations," leading to a higher prevalence of other rare genetic disorders, he
[Dr. Emmanuel Shapira, a geneticist at Tulane Medical Center] said. Throughout
southwest Louisiana unusual disorders can be found, particularly among the
Cajuns....
"It's very difficult to find any family in Iota who wasn't traceable back to
intermarriage back there," Fabacher [a physician and local genealogist] said.
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-Fifth, although a remote possibility, the common gene discovered
through DNA testing could have been contributed by someone other
than the alleged father. For instance, it is possible for the alleged child
and the tested relative to share common genes, not because they share
a common relative, but because their genetic structures coincidentally
resemble one another at the tested locus. The probability of this random
matching is reflected in the figure used to estimate the likelihood that
two individuals are related. That is, if it is stated that there is a 99.8%
probability of relationship, then there is a 0.2% chance that someone
other than the suspected father contributed the common gene. 21' This
slight possibility prevents DNA analysis from proving paternity with one
hundred percent certainty.
B. Legal Implications
Although the majority recognized that DNA tests, given the facts
of Sudwischer, would not be able to prove paternity with certainty, 212
the various difficulties of using DNA testing under the circumstances
were not fully appreciated. Besides being incapable of excluding or
including the alleged parent with certainty, the assurance that relevant
evidence will be produced, which exists when both parents are tested,
is lost. To force an individual, perhaps even a disinterested nonparty,
to submit to blood tests in order to obtain evidence that may or may
not be relevant, offends the most basic notions of individual liberty.
This consideration, more than any other, should be weighed when making
such policy decisions.
By holding that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1422
authorizes the testing sought by the plaintiff in Sudwischer, the Louisiana
Supreme Court engages in judicial legislation. Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:396 and Code of Civil Procedure article 1464 are legislative exceptions
to the fundamental rule that the individual has the right to be secure
in her person. Any judicial attempt to broaden the scope of these two
articles should be made only after a thorough debate of the issues
involved. Given the limitations of DNA typing to establish paternity
when relatives of an alleged parent are tested, the court should exercise
"They're all at some point connected to that [the Ashkenazi Jew] pedigree."
Laurie Garrett, A Hidden Killer in Cajun Country, Newsday, Nov. 26, 1990, at 4. See
also Deborah L. Grant, Tay-Sachs: Genetic Disease Has Louisiana Link, 21 Tulane
Medicine 8, 11 (1990). In this article, Dr. Shapira reports, "There's a high frequency of
intermarriage in the Cajun population and a high probability for people to share a rare
gene by descent in Louisiana."
211. Only if the statistical data that belies this figure is accurate, however, are such
determinations trustworthy.
212. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 475 (La. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992).
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caution when ordering individuals other than the mother, child, and
alleged father to submit to testing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Technology often outstrips legal practice. And when this occurs, as
is the case with DNA typing, courts should neither ignore reality by
adhering to old doctrines, 213 nor unthinkingly abandon the old for the
untested new. 214 Instead, as encouraged by the civilian tradition, 25 courts
should creatively interpret existing laws to comport with the new tech-
nology to assure justice. The court in Sudwischer, however, improperly
relied on Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1422 to compel a
nonparty, who was not the alleged mother, child, or alleged father, to
undergo blood tests. The scope of those who may be compelled to
submit to testing should at least be restricted to interested parties. For
this purpose, the court could have invoked Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1464. Moreover, given the various implications
surrounding the use of DNA testing to establish paternity when an
213. For example, in Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1946),
the infamous paternity suit against Charlie Chaplin, the appellate court, bound by prec-
edent, affirmed the trial court's finding that Chaplin was the father of the child, despite
blood test results that established non-paternity. Even though little scientific debate sur-
rounded the validity of such tests, California law did not then accept negative blood tests
as conclusive proof of non-paternity. "'Whatever claims the medical profession may make
for blood tests to determine parentage,"' read the jury instructions which were upheld
on appeal, "'this state does not declare that this type of expert testimony is conclusive
or unanswerable, therefore, you are not bound by such medical opinions."' Id. at 452.
214. For instance, in the late 1970s another genetic identification technique, known
as protein gel electrophoresis, was adopted by forensic laboratories and used in thousands
of cases. The judicial acceptance of this test was premature, however, since shortly after
its use became routine, serious doubts regarding its reliability arose. The test was later
ruled inadmissible in California and Michigan. Thompson & Ford, supra note 181, at 46-
48. "The electrophoresis debacle teaches the importance of anticipating questions that
may arise with respect to the reliability of a forensic technique and of being prepared to
respond to those questions before the technique is placed into routine use." Thompson
& Ford, supra note 181, at 48.
215. Problems non-existent and unforeseeable multiply constantly at an increasing
rate, and must be decided by the court as the litigants press for their rights.
The exegetical approach "paralyzed the judge" and prevent[ed] him from de-
termining the legal rights of man in a world unknown to the lawmakers who
framed the Code. Following the lead of G6ny, the French judiciary moved to
the "free scientific research" approach. While we may not in Louisiana be
permitted the free rein G6ny calls for, we certainly can use the techniques of
G~ny and the French jurists to determine our law when it is doubtful in language
and dubious in meaning. We are a civilian jurisdiction, and we should as a
court follow that tradition.
Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 So. 2d 619, 628 (La. 1972) (Barham, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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alleged parent is unavailable for testing, either the judiciary or the
legislature should reconsider the scope of and set, deliberately, the limits
of both Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:396(A) and Article 1464.
J.E. Cullens, Jr.*
* Recipient of the 1992-93 Vinson and Elkins "Best Casenote or Comment" Award.
